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Contracts as Literature: A Hermeneutic Approach
to the Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing in Commercial Loan Agreements
Barbara A. Fure*
INTRODUCTION
Banks have been receiving bad press lately. They have been
compared to black widow spiders' (the females eat their mates
shortly after mating). They have been described as "crude," "mali-
cious," "insensitive," and "at best, cavalier."2 Apparently, based on
the large number of lender liability lawsuits, many borrowers
strongly agree with these statements. In the. decade of the 1980's
there was an explosion of lender liability lawsuits in which borrow-
ers sued their lenders, many claiming that the lender breached the
duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract.3 This
explosion continues to have reverberations into the decade of the
1990's.4 In the past, the majority of courts that have been
* Legal Writing Instructor, University of Pittsburgh. The author wishes to thank
Patricia Lindauer and Elizabeth Kelly for their research assistance. Thanks are also ex-
tended to the staff in the Word Processing Center.
1. "Shortly after mating, the black widow spider eats her mate. Sadly, many busi-
ness banking relationships don't last much longer." Wall St J at A7 (June 4, 1991) (as stated
in an advertisement for Continental Bank).
2. Tolander v Farmers National Bank, 452 NW2d 422, 425-26 (Iowa 1990). In To-
lander, a strapped farmer's operation was closed out by a bank's setting off without notice
an unpaid loan from the farmer's checking account. Tolander, 542 NW2d at 422-23.
3. See, for example, Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v First Bank of Whiting, 908
F2d 1351 (7th Cir 1990); Penthouse Int'l., Ltd. v Dominion Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 855
F2d 963 (2d Cir 1988); Reid v Key Bank of S. Me., Inc., 821 F2d 9 (1st Cir 1987); K.M.C.
Co., Inc. v Irving Trust Co., 757 F2d 752 (6th Cir 1985); Watseka First Nat'l Bank v Ruda,
135 Il 2d 140, 552 NE2d 775 (1990); First Security Bank of Idaho v Gaige, 115 Idaho 172,
765 P2d 683 (1988); Rigby Corp. v Boatmen's Bank and Trust Co., 713 SW2d 517 (Mo Ct
App 1986); Centerre Bank of Kansas City v Distributors, Inc., 705 SW2d 42 (Mo Ct App
1985).
4. See, for example, Fasolino Foods Co., Inc. v Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 961
F2d 1052 (2d Cir 1992); Mirax Chem. Prod. Corp. v First Interstate Commercial Corp., 950
F2d 566 (8th Cir 1991); Bohm v Commerce Union Bank of Tenn., 1992 WL 135130 (WD Pa
1992); Temp- Way Corp. v Continental Bank, 139 Bankr 299 (ED Pa 1992); Whorley v First
Westside Bank, 240 Neb 975, 485 NW2d 578 (1992) Diversified Foods Inc. v First Nat'l
Bank of Boston, 605 A2d 609 (Me 1992); State Bank of Standish v Curry, 190 Mich App
616, 476 NW2d 635 (1991); Components Direct, Inc. v European Am. Bank and Trust Co.,
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presented with this claim have rejected it for various reasons.' Re-
cently, however, cases indicate and some experts believe that the
"pendulum" is swinging toward borrowers.' Nevertheless, all would
probably agree that the injection of the doctrine of the implied
duty of good faith into commercial loan agreements has produced a
confusing array of cases and commentary.
The doctrine of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
permeates cases resolving disputes over a bank's or other financial
lending institution's duties to its borrower in a commercial loan
setting. While the doctrine has struck fear into the hearts of many
a lender and its counsel, and has brought solace to a few finan-
175 AD2d 227, 572 NYS2d 359 (1991); Seattle First Nat'l Bank v Westwood Lumber, Inc.,
65 Wash App 811, 829 P2d 1152 (1992). See also Joseph S. Hellman, Arbitration Clause
Can Stave Off Legal Wars, Am Banker at 4 (Feb. 4, 1992) ("The financial climate has re-
newed the threat of lender liability.").
5. See, for example, Mirax Chem. Prod. Corp. v Interstate Commercial Corp., 950
F2d 566 (8th Cir 1991)(the implied duty of good faith does not apply to demand instru-
ments); Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v First Bank of Whiting, 908 F2d 1351 (7th Cir
1990)(the implied duty of good faith does not overrule literal enforcement of express terms
in agreement); Spencer Companies, Inc. v Chase Manhattan Bank, 81 Bankr 194 (D Mass
1987)(the holder of a demand does not need a good faith reason or any reason at all to
demand payment); Flagship Nat'l Bank v Gray Distribution System, Inc., 485 S2d 1336
(Fla Dist Ct App 1986)(good faith does not override express terms in the contract); First
Sec. Bank of Idaho v Gaige, 115 Idaho 172, 765 P2d 683 (1988)(bank did not breach implied
duty of good faith when it exercised its express rights in the written agreement); Watseka
First Nat'l Bank v Ruda, 135 Ill 2d 140, 552 NE2d 775 (1990)(the test for whether lender
accelerated loan in good faith is subjective/honest belief standard; here lender had honest
belief that obligation could not be paid). Compare Reid, 821.F2d at 9 (cited in note 3)(evi-
dence concerning manner in which bank conducted dealings with commercial borrower, in
precipitously and without warning halting further advances on which it knew borrower's
business depended, supported jury verdict of bad faith); K.M.C., 757 F2d at 752 (cited in
note 3)(lender's power to demand repayment under a demand note was subject to good faith
obligation); and Weinberg v Farmers State Bank of Worden, 231 Mont 10, 752 P2d 719
(1988) (bank breached implied duty of good faith by failing to extend line of credit in accor-
dance with agreement with debtor).
6. Experts Say Pendulum Swinging Toward Borrowers in Lender Liability, BNA
Banking Report at 949 (Dec. 9, 1991). See also Hellman, Am Bankr at 4 (cited in note 4),
stating that "Worse still, the intermediate appellate courts in New York, at least now, seem
to be buying some of these arguments. Bad law is being made. Lenders are not only not
collecting on simple promissory notes; they are incurring possible affirmative liability to
their borrowers." See also Quality Automotive Co. v Signet Bank/Maryland, 775 F Supp
849 (D Md 1991)(bank has a duty to exercise good faith with regard to notice when deciding
to terminate the loan and security agreement); B.P.G. Autoland Jeep-Eagle v Chrysler
Credit, 785 F Supp 222 (D Mass 1991)(cut-off of borrower's line of credit is act of bad faith);
Components Direct v European American Bank, 175 AD2d 227, 572 NYS2d 359
(1991)(bank could be found to have violated good faith when it terminated credit to corpo-
ration without notice); and Siegner v Interstate Prod. Credit Ass'n, 109 Or App 417, 820
P2d 20 (1991)(evidence of breach of oral agreement supported breach of implied duty of
good faith).
Commercial Loan Agreements
cially-ruined borrowers, it has nevertheless engendered nothing but
confusion and, at times, injustice. This article is a response to that
confusion. The article will show that, as currently applied to com-
mercial loan agreements, the doctrine is unnecessary. The empha-
sis in resolving the dispute should be on the real issue which, as
will be demonstrated, is interpretation. Furthermore, courts resolv-
ing these disputes must not only focus on the real issue of interpre-
tation, but they must also begin to apply a more capacious ap-
proach to interpretation. They must consider more than the four
corners of the written document to determine the agreement be-
tween the parties. In the area of loan agreements, courts generally
resist looking beyond the written document for meaning. Never-
theless, in many loan transactions, the parties define a significant
number of crucial terms in their oral communications prior to or
after signing the agreement. Courts must begin to accept this real-
ity and adjudicate cases in a fair manner that reflects this commer-
cial reality.
One possible reason for a court's resistance to looking beyond
the written document is suggested by Professor John Murray. Pro-
fessor Murray has observed that in situations with which a court
does not have familiarity, a court's analysis will be limited to the
only thing it knows for certain, namely, the documents. Con-
versely, he observed that the documents will not be conclusive to a
court in situations with which it has familiarity. 7 Thus, in order for
a court to determine the nature of the agreement, it must become
familiarwith the behavior patterns of the parties under the partic-
ular circumstances of their transactions. To this end, this article
will also attempt to familiarize decisionmakers with the realities of
commercial lending so that these decisionmakers understand that
the parties usually do not treat the documents as conclusive and,
in fact, may totally discount them.
Finally, drawing on the field of literature, this article will intro-
duce readers to and apply the hermeneutics of the literary theorist,
E.D. Hirsch.' Hirsch argues that the only valid form of interpreta-
tion that is worthy of intellectual respectability is one that consid-
ers all of the circumstances surrounding the text.' In the case of
commercial loan agreements, the text is the written agreement be-
tween the parties.
7. John E. Murray, Jr., The Realism of Behaviorism Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 51 Or L Rev 269, 292 (1972).
8. E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation (1967).
9. See generally Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation at 164-207.
1993
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Hirsch's theory of interpretation of texts, which is mainly di-
rected to literature, emphasizes the need to discover authorial in-
tent.10 Therefore, it should not be surprising that his ideas on in-
terpretation are strikingly similar to those of one of the most
eminent scholars of contract law, Arthur Corbin, who believes that
the aim of contract interpretation should be discovery of the intent
of the parties." Thus, this article relies heavily on both Hirsch and
Corbin in the sections on interpretation since one of the main
premises in the article is that courts must focus on the intent of
the parties to ensure just results. Furthermore, although Hirsch's
theories mirror Corbin's in many ways, Hirsch's theory goes be-
yond Corbin's. Hirsch, as a literary hermeneutist, provides more
insight into the nature of interpretation and more guidance into
the process of interpretation, which is, the process of determining
and weighing all of the relevant evidence surrounding the text be-
ing interpreted.
Looking to the field of literature for interpretive theories to aid
in the field of legal interpretation is not new. Usually, however, the
theory is being applied to the interpretation of statutes, the Con-
stitution, or judicial opinions. 2 Nevertheless, whether the subject
of interpretation is a constitution, "a statute, the words in a con-
10. It should be noted that when interpreting literature, which is the type of text to
which Hirsch's theories are mainly directed, the author who is being interpreted is obvious.
It is always the writer of the literature. When interpreting contracts, the author is not quite
so obvious. Conceivably, there could be two authors. Both parties could have had input into
writing the contract. The interpreter would then be the judge. Alternatively, and more likely
when dealing with bank loan agreements, there is one author of the contract - the bank. In
this case, the borrower, as well as the court, would be an interpreter. This distinction, how-
ever, is not a significant distinction for purposes of this article.
In contrast to Hirsch's position is that of Hans-George Gadamer whose theories are fre-
quently the basis of theories of legal interpretation. Gadamer believes that the meaning of a
text, not occasionally, but always, goes well beyond its author. H. G. Gadamer, Truth and
Method 264 (1975). For a discussion of Gadamer's position see generally Francis J. Mootz,
The Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the
Work of Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur, 68 BU L Rev 523, 533 (1988); Teresa G. Phelps
and Jenny A. Pitts, Questioning the Text: The Significance of Phenomenological Herme-
neutics for Legal Interpretation, 29 SLU L Rev 353, 367 (1985).
11. See Arthur L. Corbin, 3 Corbin on Contracts Chapters 24 and 26 (West, 1960)
("Corbin on Contracts") and Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol
Evidence Rule, 50 Cornell L Q 161 (1965).
12. See, for example, Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tex Rev 373
(1982)(constitutional interpretation); Simeon C.R. McIntosh, Legal Hermeneutics: A Philo-
sophical Critique, 35 Okla L Rev 1 (1982)(statutory, constitutional, and contract interpreta-
tion); Mootz, 68 BU L Rev at 523 (cited in note 10) (statutory, constitutional, and judicial
opinion interpretation); Phelps and Pitts, 29 SLU L Rev at 353 (cited in note 10) (constitu-
tional and statutory interpretation); Brad Sherman, Hermeneutics in Law, 51 Mod L Rev
386 (1988)(legal interpretation of law in general).
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tract, a novel by Henry James, or a poem by Robert Browning, '1 3
the difficulties and opportunities in interpretation are the same.1'
Before undertaking a detailed discussion of Hirsch and his the-
ory, this article will examine the various definitions and applica-
tions of the implied duty of good faith within the context of com-
mercial loan agreements. This analysis will show that the
underlying issue is determining and interpreting the parties' agree-
ment. Next, the article will review the current law in the area of
interpretation of these types of agreements to show that much
thinking about meaning and interpretation produces confusion and
injustice. In addition, this article will show that current thinking
fails to take note of the present day commercial reality of the busi-
ness of banking. Next, the article will discuss Hirsch's theory of
hermeneutics, the interpretation of texts, found in his seminal
work on interpretation, Validity in Interpretation.1 5 Along with
this discussion will be a comparison of Hirsch's ideas to those of
Professor Corbin. Finally, this article will show that application of
Hirsch's principles to contract interpretation in commercial loan
settings would be a vast improvement over the current mode of
interpreting contracts: by applying Hirsch's principles, courts
would recognize current banking practices and, as a result, would
enforce the true, intended agreement of the parties based upon
their reasonable expectations.
I. THE IMPLIED DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
There is an overwhelming amount of commentary and case law
discussing the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, its exis-
tence, and its meaning.1 6 It is now an express obligation in the
13. Corbin, 50 Cornell L Q at 187 (cited in note 11).
14. James B. White, Law As Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60
Tex L Rev 415 (1982); see also McIntosh, 35 Okla L Rev at 1 (cited in note 12) ("literary
and legal interpretation share some hermeneutic concerns") and Walter B. Michaels,
Against Formalism: The Autonomous Text in Legal and Literary Interpretation, 1 Poetics
Today 23 (1979).
15. See note 8.
16. See, for example, Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith and Lender Liability (But-
terworth, 1990); Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Per-
form in Good Faith, 94 Harv L Rev 369 (1980); Susan D. Gresham, "Bad Faith Breach": A
New and Growing Concern for Financial Institutions, 42 Vand L Rev 891 (1989); Jane L.
Rodda, The Role of Good Faith in Lender Liability Suits: Rising Star or Fading Gadfly?,
31 Ariz L Rev 939 (1989); Note, Illinois Standard of Good Faith Under Section 1-208 of the
U.C.C.: Watseka First National Bank v Ruda Creates A Subjective Standard, 4 DePaul
Bus L J 191 (1991); Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith - Its Recognition
and Conceptualization, 67 Cornell L Rev 810 (1982); Comment, What's So Good About
1993 733
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Uniform Commercial Code"7 and is acknowledged in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts. 8 Nevertheless, a close examination of
the cases and commentary discussing the implied duty of good
faith as used in commercial loan documents discloses that applica-
tion of the concept often causes injustice, and always causes confu-
sion and unpredictability. The reason is that the duty of good faith
is really nothing more than the basic contract principle that each
party's reasonable expectations should be satisfied according to the
agreement, as determined by manifestations of intent. Many courts
and commentators already explicitly equate the duty of good faith
with a duty to fulfill the justifiable, reasonable expectations of the
parties. 19 What the courts are actually deciding, therefore, under
the pretext of deciding good faith, is the nature of the parties' ex-
pectations as revealed by the circumstances existing when they
made their agreement.
A. The Subjective "Honesty in Fact" Standard
Frequently, courts define the conduct required by the implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing as "honesty in fact."2 0 This
standard has sometimes been referred to as the "pure heart and
empty head test."2' It requires determining the subjective state of
mind of the bank officer. To satisfy this definition of good faith,
the bank need only show that its officer had an honest belief that
certain conditions were present. This standard is used in situations
in which, for example, the bank is claiming that it accelerated pay-
ment of a loan under an "insecurity clause" or abruptly terminated
a line of credit based on its honest belief that there were valid bus-
iness reasons for its actions.2" Nevertheless, framing the issue in
this manner is inadequate. Instead, the court should determine
Good Faith? The Good Faith Performance Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U Chi L
Rev 1335 (1988); Comment, Section 1-208: "Good Faith" and the Need for a Uniform Stan-
dard, 73 Marq L Rev 639 (1990). See notes 3-5 for cites to cases.
17. Uniform Commercial Code §§ 1-201 and 2-103(1)(b) (1990).
18. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1979).
19. See, for example, Weinberg, 752 P.2d at 731 (good faith and fair dealing is mea-
sured in a particular contract by justifiable expectations of the parties); State Nat'l Bank v
Academia, Inc., 802 SW2d 282, 293 (Tex Ct App 1990)(good faith requires exercising discre-
tion in a manner consistent with reasonable expectations); Patterson at notes 83-85 and
accompanying text; Burton at notes 61-62 and accompanying text; and Summers at notes
45-49 and accompanying text.
20. See, for example, Watseka First Nat'l Bank, 552 NE2d at 778; and Rigby Corp.,
713 SW2d at 527.
21. Watseka First Nat'l Bank, 552 NE2d at 779.
22. See, for example, K.M.C., 757 F2d at 760.
734 Vol. 31:729'
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what the borrower understood the bank to mean when the bank
explained how acceleration or termination of credit would be trig-
gered. The fact that a loan officer may have an honest belief that
valid business reasons existed to terminate a line of credit is rele-
vant only to the extent that the reasons correspond with what the
parties agreed would be a valid reason. Good faith is irrelevant ex-
cept that it is reflected in keeping one's promises. Furthermore,
after the initial question is answered and the court has discovered
the act(s) that the parties agreed would trigger an acceleration or
termination, the bank must then present objective evidence to
show that the act(s) occurred. For example, if impairment of pay-
ment was the agreed upon act, the bank would have to rely on
objective evidence, such as financial reports showing lack of or de-
crease in revenue.23 Thus, it is apparent that the so-called subjec-
tive honesty in fact standard is useless in these situations. More-
over, the history of the subjective standard shows that it was never
intended to apply to commercial loan transactions. It was intended
to apply to the doctrine of good faith purchase of negotiable in-
struments where, presumably, it is workable. 24
B. K.M.C. Co. Inc. - The Objective Standard
In contrast to the subjective standard of honesty in fact, several
courts have gone much further and have, under the guise of an
"objective" standard of good faith, required a duty of reasonable-
ness.26 As a result, obligations have been imposed on banks that
were not necessarily part of the parties' intended agreement. For
example, in one of the most famous and most frequently criticized
"good faith" cases, K.M.C. Co., Inc. ("K.M.C.") v Irving Trust
Company ("Irving"),26 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that an instruction to the jury that "there is implied in every con-
tract an obligation of good faith . .. [was] an accurate statement
of the applicable law . .." This implied obligation imposed on
Irving a duty to give notice to K.M.C. before refusing to advance
23. See James J. White and Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code §25-3 at
1192 (West, 3d ed 1990) quoted in Watseka First Nat'l, 552 NE2d at 781.
24. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 Comment b (1979); see also Robert S.
Summers, "Good Faith" In General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 54 Va L Rev 195, 208 (1968).
25. See, for example, Quality Automotive Co. v Signet Bank/Maryland, 775 F Supp
849 (D Md 1991); Components Direct v European American Bank, 175 AD2d 227, 572
NYS2d 359 (1991); and K.M.C., 757 F2d at 759.
26. 757 F2d 752 (6th Cir 1985).
27. K.M.C., 757 F2d at 759.
1993
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funds up to the maximum credit limit under a discretionary line of
credit, even though the written agreement did not contain any no-
tice provision.28
Irving held a security interest in all of K.M.C.'s accounts receiv-
able and inventory.2 9 As part of the agreement, all receipts of
K.M.C. were to be deposited in a "blocked account" to which Ir-
ving would have sole access.30 Consequently, unless K.M.C. ob-
tained alternative financing, a refusal by Irving to advance funds
would leave K.M.C. without operating capital.3 1 On March 1, 1982,
Irving refused to advance $800,000 requested by K.M.C.32 This
amount would have increased the loan balance to just under the
$3.5 million limit.3 According to K.M.C., this refusal resulted in
the collapse of K.M.C. as a viable business entity.34 K.M.C. con-
tended that Irving's refusal, without prior notice, to advance the
requested funds breached a duty of good faith implied in the
agreement.36
Following the subjective school of thought, Irving contended
that even if there were a duty of good faith, the sole factor deter-
minative of whether it acted in good faith was whether it, through
its loan officer, believed that there existed valid reasons for not
advancing funds to K.M.C.386 Irving argued that it based its deci-
sion not on the amount of the security, but on K.M.C.'s capacity to
pay back the loan. According to Irving, K.M.C. was in a state of
financial collapse based on its payables and receivables; therefore,
Irving's decision not to advance funds was made in good faith and
in the reasonable exercise of its discretion under the agreement. 8
Irving reasoned further that this implied requirement to provide
notice was inconsistent with the provision in the agreement that all
monies loaned were repayable on demand. 9
The appellate court was not persuaded by any of Irving's argu-
ments. It asserted that Irving's conduct must be measured by ob-
28. Id.
29. Id at 754.
30. Id at 759.
31. Id.




36. Id at 760.
37. Id at 762.
38. Id.
39. Id at 759.
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jective standards, requiring at least "some objective basis upon
which a reasonable loan officer in the exercise of his discretion
would have acted in that manner. '40 Because there was ample evi-
dence that Irving was adequately secured and thus no losses would
be sustained by Irving in the event of liquidation, there was no
justification for Irving's actions in refusing to advance further
funds, even if the loan officer believed that K.M.C. was in a state
of financial collapse. "1 According to the opinion of the court, as
long as the bank is adequately secured, financial collapse of a bor-
rower is never reasonable justification to take action to protect the
bank.42
The court's proposition is not only preposterous, but it totally
misses the relevant issue; namely, what was the agreement of the
parties regarding refusal to advance funds, and regarding notice in
connection with a refusal? By focusing on the implied duty of good
*faith and using an objective "reasonable loan officer" standard, the
court does not attempt to determine the circumstances surround-
ing the agreement that could provide some indication of the par-
ties' expectations. As a result, the court, in effect, made the agree-
ment for the parties and failed to provide meaningful guidance for
the future.
It is true that the refusal to advance funds under these circum-
stances proved to be extremely detrimental to K.M.C.; however,
borrowers are free to enter into unfavorable agreements, and these
agreements should then be enforced. There is nothing inherently
"bad" in a bank having significant control over a borrower. It is
not uncommon for a bank to maintain complete control over cer-
tain borrowers.' Furthermore, according to banking practices, it
would not be unusual for a bank to have such a "tough" deal under
circumstances such as those in K.M.C., where a borrower's ac-
counts are collateral, because "[t]he commercial finance industry
traditionally has been tougher in lending against accounts. .. .""
On the other hand, if the borrower was in fact led to believe that it
would receive notice prior to termination of credit, that, then, is
the agreement that should be enforced. Nevertheless, the court did
not attempt to determine K.M.C.'s and Irving's understanding of
40. Id at 761 (emphasis in original).
41. Id at 762.
42. Id at 763.
43. Marilyn M. Barnewall, Loan Quality Need Not Suffer Because of Aggressive Pol-
icies, Am Banker at 23 (May 26, 1987).
44. John F. Dolan, Fundamentals of Commercial Activity 274 (1991).
1993
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the agreement. And, according to the court, the parties' under-
standing was irrelevant, because parties are not bound by their
agreements, but by what "reasonable" parties would agree to.
C. The Excluder Analysis
In one of the earliest and most influential articles on the duty of
good faith in contracts, Professor Robert Summers argued that
good faith cannot be defined: "[G]ood faith. . . is best understood
as an 'excluder'-it is a phrase which has no general meaning or
meanings of its own, but which serves to exclude many heterogene-
ous forms of bad faith. 4 5 A lawyer is to determine what a judge
means by using the phrase "good faith" by asking himself, "What
does the judge intend to rule out by his use of this phrase?"" Once
the relevant form of bad faith is thus identified, the lawyer can, if
he wishes, assign a specific meaning to good faith by formulating
an "opposite" for the species of bad faith being ruled out.' 7 Sum-
mers then provides a survey of particular forms of contractual bad
faith.4 The closest he gets to a general definition is stating that
"[i]n most cases, the party acting in bad faith frustrates the justi-
fied expectations of another.
'4 9
This approach, referred to as the "excluder analysis," was
adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which ac-
knowledges the implied duty of good faith but, like Summers, gives
it no definition. Specifically, section 205 provides that "Every con-
tract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing
in its performance and its enforcement. ' 50 Comment a adds that
the emphasis of good faith is "consistency with the justified expec-
tations of the other party. '51 Comments c and d give examples
taken from Summers' article.
52
The significance that both Summers and the Restatement place
on the justified expectations of a party illustrates the superfluous-
ness of good faith. Summers equates bad faith with frustration of a
party's justified expectations, and the Restatement has character-
ized consistency with these expectations as the 'emphasis' of good
45. Summers, 54 Va L Rev at 196 (cited in note 24).
46. Id at 200.
47. Id.
48. Id at 220-52.
49. Id at 263.
50. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1979).
51. Restatement at § 205 comment a.
52. Id at comments c and d.
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Commercial Loan Agreements
faith. Nevertheless, protecting the justified expectations of a party
does not require implying a duty of good faith; rather, it is a long-
standing fundamental principle of contract interpretation which
reflects good faith in that it ensures fairness and justice. In most
cases, the difficulty is determining and interpreting the agreement
to discover what the justified expectations are. Injecting theories of
good faith diverts focus from the real issue.
Moreover, cases that have relied upon the excluder analysis as a
standard of good faith illustrate that the doctrine of good faith is
redundant. 53 For example, in Siegner v Interstate Prod. Credit
Ass'n,54 where the court approved of Summers' excluder theory as
the correct standard of good faith, two ranchers were suing a credit
association claiming breach of contract and breach of the duty of
good faith as well. The ranchers were told by the credit associa-
tion's representative that certain terms in the written agreement
were mere formalities and did not represent the true agreement.
55
The credit association then attempted to rely only on the express
terms of the written agreement s.5 The court acknowledged that the
real issue was not good faith, but was the nature of the true agree-
ment, considering all of the surrounding circumstances: "The ma-
jor underlying issue is whether the evidence of the circumstances
surrounding the parties' agreement. . . should have been excluded
because of the parol evidence rule."'57 The court did admit the pa-
rol evidence and determined the agreement by considering all of
the relevant evidence "concerning the circumstances surrounding
the negotiation and execution of the written document.
58
Notwithstanding the court's admission of the real issue as one of
determining the true agreement of the parties, the court still ad-
dressed the good faith issue.59 The good faith analysis, however,
was clearly unnecessary. The court simply repeated its holding
53. See, for example, Garrett v Bankwest, Inc., 459 NW2d 833, 845 (SD 1990) (un-
derlying issue was whether the bank agreed to purchase or redeem the borrower's property
after liquidation sale) quoting Summers, 54 Va L Rev at 196 (cited in note 24).
54. 109 Or App 417, 820 P.2d 20, 31 (1991)(approving jury instructions stating that
"Good faith . . . excludes a variety of conduct characterized as 'bad faith' because such
conduct violates community standards of decency, fairness, or reasonableness. Subterfuges
and evasions violate the obligation of good faith ... It is not possible to catalogue all con-
duct which might constitute bad faith within the context of a particular contract.") For a
discussion of Siegner, see notes 135-43 and 235-62 and accompanying text.
55. Siegner, 820 P2d at 23.
56. Id at 25.
57. Id.
58. Id at 27.
59. Id at 31.
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that the credit association could not rely only on the terms of the
written agreement because that did not represent the entire agree-
ment between the parties.60
D. The "Foregone Opportunities" Analysis
Another commentator on good faith whose theory has had some
influence in adjudication of good faith in commercial banking cases
is Professor Steven J. Burton." An analysis of Burton's theory also
supports the contention that focusing on issues of good faith obfus-
cates the underlying issues of interpretation and of satisfying the
reasonable expectations of the parties. He is in agreement with the
thesis of this article, admitting that "courts employ the good faith
performance doctrine to effectuate the intentions of parties, or to
protect their reasonable expectations, through interpretation
"62
Notwithstanding Burton's agreement on this initial point, how-
ever, rather than viewing the underlying problem as one of ascer-
taining the intended agreement and reasonable expectations of the
parties by looking beyond the four corners of the written agree-
ment, Burton characterizes the problem of the good faith perform-
ance cases as lack of focus.6 3 He criticizes courts and commentators
for not articulating a focused operational standard that distin-
guishes good faith performance from bad faith performance. 4 He
then provides his own operational standard of good faith:
65
60. Id at 31-32.
61. Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to
Professor Summers, 69 Iowa L Rev 497 (1984); Burton, 94 Harv L Rev 369 (cited in note
16). For cases that have applied his standard, see, for example, Kham, 908 F2d at 1357; and
State Nat'l Bank v Academia, 802 SW2d at 293.
62. Burton, 69 Iowa L Rev at 499 (cited in note 61); see also Burton, 94 Harv L Rev
at 371 (cited in note 16).
63. Burton, 94 Harv L Rev at 371-72.
64. Id at 369.
65. Id. Burton also maintains that based on a survey of over 400 cases, the only cases
in which courts explicitly raise the implied covenant of good faith are discretion cases; that
is, cases in which the parties deferred decision on a particular term or in which there is a
lack of clarity because of an omission in the express contract. Id at 380. This may have been
true in 1980 when Burton wrote his article, but it certainly is not the case now. Burton's
characterization of the good faith cases does not accurately represent the lender liability
cases which are the subject of this article. The cases surveyed for this article show that the
cases discussing or applying the implied duty of good faith are cases in which the parties
disagree over the nature of the agreement. Usually, the borrower is relying on evidence ex-
trinsic to the written agreement to determine the true agreement, and the bank is relying
only on the express terms of the written agreement. Id.
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Good faith limits the exercise of discretion in performance conferred on one
party by the contract. When a discretion-exercising party may determine
aspects of the contract, such as quantity, price or time, it controls the
other's anticipated benefits . . . Bad faith performance occurs precisely
when discretion is used to recapture opportunities foregone upon con-
tracting-when the discretion-exercising party refuses to pay the expected
cost of performance. Good faith performance, in turn, occurs when a party's
discretion is exercised for any purpose within the reasonable contemplation
of the parties at the time of formation-to capture opportunities that were
preserved upon entering the contract, interpreted objectively."
Burton suggests two questions to ask to determine whether the
discretion-exercising promisor breached a contract by using its dis-
cretion in bad faith: (1) at formation, what were the reasonably
expected costs of performance (foregone opportunities) to the dis-
cretion-exercising promisor and (2) at performance, did the discre-
tion-exercising promisor use its discretion to recapture an opportu-
nity foregone on contracting?6 7 The first question focuses attention
on the time of formation, and is an objective inquiry into the rea-
sonable expectations of the promisee as to opportunities foregone
by the discretion-exercising promisor by contracting. The second
question is an inquiry into subjective intent at the time for per-
formance. Having made these determinations, one then can con-
clude with reasonable certainty whether the dependent party's
claim that it did not receive what it was entitled to is sound.
Burton's standard again illustrates the superfluousness of the
doctrine of good faith. The standard articulated by Burton does
not distinguish good faith functionally" from the purpose of the
objective theory of contracts, protecting the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties. More importantly, it does not focus on the
problematic area in the cases, namely, how a court should ascertain
the reasonable expectations of the parties. Although Burton directs
courts to focus only upon the facts that relate to the opportunities
foregone by the discretion-exercising party at formation, he pro-
vides no guidance as to how a court determines these foregone op-
portunities. He even questions whether his own theory is workable.
He is not sure whether it is possible to determine the identity of
foregone opportunities in a particular case.6 9 Moreover, by advising
66. Burton, 94 Harv L Rev at 372-73 (cited in note 16).
67. Burton, 69 Iowa L Rev at 506-07 (cited in note 61).
68. Id at 511.
69. Id at 507 n 41. He does, however, seem to contradict himself in an earlier footnote
in which he explains that he "think[s] that the good faith performance cases typically are
cases in which the reasonable expectations of the parties can be reasonably ascertained,
1993
Duquesne Law Review
courts to focus only upon specific facts, even when determining
specific reasonable expectations, Burton's analysis is too limited in
scope. When interpreting a contract and determining the reasona-
ble expectations of the parties, one must look at all of the sur-
rounding circumstances to put specifics in context.
Burton does, however, support this article's premise that courts
must go beyond the four corners of the document to determine the
parties' agreement and expectations. He does this by implication,
in a footnote, when he maintains that: "Express language accord-
ingly will fail to set forth all of the specific undertakings of the
parties. '70 This statement accurately describes the problem. The
express terms of the written agreement fail to manifest the in-
tended agreement; therefore, courts must look beyond the express
terms. Unfortunately, it appears from Burton's statements refer-
ring to "express" language and "express" contract that he (like
many courts) 71 believes that only the express terms manifest prom-
ise. This belief is erroneous. Cases that have presumably used Bur-
ton's standard illustrate this point.
72
For example, in State National Bank ("Bank") v Academia,
Inc. ,73 a Texas appellate court, applying Burton's standard, consid-
ered only the express terms of the written contract in ascertaining
the expectation of the parties. In Academia, the Bank sued
Academia, the borrower, for a deficiency under a note. 7' Academia
alleged that there was an oral agreement with the Bank that the
note due on its face on October 30, 1986 would not have to be fully
using an objective theory of contract interpretation..." Id at 500 n 18. This, as this article
has been arguing, is the main problem and should be the focus of the cases.
70. Burton, 94 Harv L Rev at 380 n 44 (cited in note 16).
71. See, for example, Savers Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v Home Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 721 F Supp 940, 943 (WD Tenn 1989)(asserting that the parties' agreement is evi-
denced by the "signed documents, especially in the world of commercial loans"); Flagship
Nat'l Bank v Gray Distrib. Sys., Inc., 485 So2d 1336, 1340-41 (Fla Dist Ct App 1986)(rely-
ing only on the express provisions of the written loan agreement); First Sec. Bank of Idaho
v Gaige, 115 Idaho 172, 765 P2d 683, 686-87 (1988)(holding that "real deal" consists only of
written guaranty); Shiplet v First Sec. Bank of Livingston, Inc., 234 Mont 166, 762 P2d 242,
245 (1988); Garrett v Bankwest, Inc., 459 NW2d 833, 845 (SD 1990) (emphasizing the "plain
language" of the written agreement); Kham, 908 F.2d at 1357 (relying only on the express
terms of the written contract).
72. See, for example, State Nat'l Bank v Academia, 802 SW2d at 282; Kham, 908
F2d at 1357 (stating that " 'Good faith' is a compact reference to an implied'undertaking
not to take opportunistic advantage in a way that could not have been contemplated at the
time of drafting. ) See notes 168-98 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of
Kham.
73. 802 SW2d 282 (Tex Ct App 1990).
74. Academia, 802 SW2d at 286.
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repaid until after the 1987. selling season .The Bank began fore-
closure in December 1986; therefore, Academia claimed that the
Bank acted in bad faith by breaching its alleged oral agreement
not to call the note before the end of the 1987 selling season." The
borrower argued that oral evidence was necessary "as an aid to
construing [the contract]," and the jury believed and found for the
borrower.7 The appellate court, however, explained the duty of
good faith and fair dealing as follows: "The duty applies not in an
overarching fashion, covering every aspect of the parties' relation-
ship, but rather it limits one party's discretion where a contract
gives the party that discretion . . . The Illinois courts do not use
the duty to overcome the parties' expectations .... 178 Holding
for the Bank, the appellate court reasoned that Academia's claims
could not form the basis for breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing because it "would be contrary to the written
contract."e
7
That the claim based on good faith is unnecessary is established
by the fact that Academia also claimed breach of contract based on
the "oral agreement" that the Bank would postpone collecting on
the note. Furthermore, focusing on good faith diverts focus from
the real issue: did the Bank, through any of its manifestations of
intent, lead Academia reasonably to expect that it would not re-
quire payment until after the 1987 selling season? To answer this
question, one must consider and weigh all of the evidence, as the
lower court did, not just the express terms of the written
agreement.
E. The "Hypothetical Reconstruction" Analysis
One commentator, Dennis Patterson, who has written several ar-
ticles and a book on the subject of good faith and lender liability,
also recognizes that the real question is "What is the Agreement of
the Parties?" 80 and agrees that the traditional notion of "reasona-
ble expectation" is the core of good faith.81 Notwithstanding his
75. Id at 288.
76. Id.
77. Id at 292.
78. Id at 293 (emphasis in original).
79. Id at 294.
80. Patterson, Good Faith and Lender Liability at 143 (cited in note 16). See also
Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance
and Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U Pa L Rev 335 (1988); and A Fable From the
Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 Iowa L Rev 503 (1991).
81. Patterson, Good Faith and Lender Liability at ix (cited in note 16).
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recognition of the underlying issue, as one of determining the
agreement of the parties in order to fulfill 'the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties, Patterson, as all of the other theorists, diverts
focus from this issue and goes on to articulate a "test" to deter-
mine good faith. He claims that this test "defines the parameters
within which triers of fact can decide between competing recon-
structions of the agreement of the parties."8
Patterson's test to determine good faith is to ask, "Given what
the parties each knew, and with a full appreciation of the several
sources for the meaning of the original Agreement, which of the
two proposed reconstructions of the meaning of the original Agree-
ment is consistent with the original materials?"83 There are several
problems with this test. First, Patterson does not provide any elab-
oration on his test to aid the fact finder, whom he assumes will
always be the jury. Second, Patterson also assumes contrary to the
assumptions of most commentators,8 ' that "lay juries are compe-
tent to judge the 'reasonableness' of commercial practices. '
85
Third, his test fails to inform the jury what they are to consider
when they consider "what party each knew." In addition, Patter-
son does not delineate the sources that the members of the jury are
to "fully appreciate." Finally, assuming the jury has these sources
and knowledge, Patterson does not articulate the "original materi-
als" with which the proposed reconstruction is to be consistent.
Moreover, when Patterson applies his test to K.M.C., 86 he seems
82. Id at 152. Another problem with Patterson's analysis is that theoretically it would
be irrelevant in many cases. Patterson believes that reconstruction of the meaning and con-
tent of the concept of good faith must begin with consideration of the Uniform Commercial
Code's (the "Code") definition of the term in section 1-203. He seems to conclude that the
Code governs because the transaction involves a secured transaction under Article 9. He
then goes into a very long, involved analysis of the Code. However, the Code will not always
be applicable for several reasons. First, not all commercial transactions are secured transac-
tions. "Unsecured loan agreements are not unusual in commercial banking .... " Dolan,
Fundamentals of Commercial Activity at 274 (cited in note 44). Second, even if a transac-
tion is secured by collateral, the collateral may be only real estate which is not governed by
the Code. Third, many times the main agreement governing the relationship between the
lender and the borrower and, consequently, the agreement that is the subject of litigation, is
the loan agreement, which is not governed by the Code. Id at 272. Only the note (if negotia-
ble), the security agreement, and the financing statement are defined and governed by the
Code. The note would come under Article 3, and the last two documents would be under
Article 9. Thus, unless a judge applies the Code by analogy, Patterson's analysis would theo-
retically be irrelevant in many cases.
83. Patterson, Good Faith and Lender Liability at 149 (cited in note 16).
84. See, for example, Alvin B. Davis, The Case Against Juries in Lender Liability,
ABA Banking J 184 (Oct 1987); and note 110.
85. Patterson, Good Faith and Lender Liability at 154 (cited in note 16).
86. Id at 151. For a discussion of K.M.C., see notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
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to apply a different test that deliberately ignores the actual agree-
ment of the parties. In his analysis of K.M.C., he posits the rele-
vant question as, "Is it reasonable for a business person engaged in
this sort of enterprise to agree to a financing arrangement whereby
the lender could put the borrower out of business with impunity
and with no reasonable business motive? '87 His phrasing of the
question is clearly biased and argumentative. Obviously, the only
answer that a lay jury would give to Patterson's phrasing of the
question is "of course not." Many of the relevant facts are missing,
such as the circumstances surrounding the making of the agree-
ment and the circumstances surrounding the lender's refusal to ad-
vance further funds. More importantly, the answer to Patterson's
question will not lead the jury to search for the parties' intended
agreement. Rather, the question permits the jury to develop an
agreement on their own. The parties are forced to comply with an
agreement that the jury believes is a "commercially reasonable"
one.
Patterson would have the jury listen to two "hypothetical" re-
constructions and decide which one sounds more commercially rea-
sonable. However, if the goal is to satisfy the purposes of contract
law, the task for the jury should be to search for the agreement of
the parties. Thus, the question in K.M.C. should be, "Did Irving
manifest any intention to K.M.C. to lead K.M.C. to reasonably ex-
pect that Irving would continue financing K.M.C.'s business pro-
vided that Irving remained adequately secure, or, on the other
hand, did Irving lead K.M.C. to reasonably expect that Irving
would have discretion to refuse funds if Irving thought that
K.M.C.'s capacity for repayment of the loan was impaired?" Recall
that Irving claimed that K.M.C.'s deteriorating financial condition
was the reason for its refusal to advance funds.
Patterson's test is based on the assumption that a bank and a
borrower cannot have any shared expectations because they share
no basis on which to ground judgments about their (un)common
experiences. Therefore, it makes no sense to direct a court to in-
quire into the reasonableness of the parties' expectations only to
find that they share no common experiential basis. He contends
that small businesspersons cannot be expected to know the mean-
ing of terms from an "insider's" perspective. Since they lack a
common basis of understanding with the lender, the borrower can-
not be held to the same standard of "reasonableness" as the
87. Patterson, Good Faith and Lender Liability at 151 (cited in note 16).
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lender.88 He believes that the specific problem is that the expecta-
tions of the parties are not thoroughly spelled out at the time the
express terms are agreed to: "The problem comes when one party
seeks to effectuate or act on an inchoate expectation which, when
brought to the attention of the other party, causes that party to
react with claims of understanding (the terms of the Agreement)
inconsistent with that (other) inchoate expectation." 89 This, how-
ever, is not the case.
Patterson's assumptions and conclusions are faulty. First, the
problem usually arises when the borrower seeks to act on an expec-
tation that was induced by the bank that cannot be found merely
by looking at the four corners of the written document. As the
cases discussed in this article illustrate, in many situations, the
meaning that is being disputed was manifested to the borrower at
the time of formation. The assumption that the borrower and
lender have no shared expectations is not justified. A review of the
cases shows that in many instances, the borrowers, had extensive
experience in financing, and usually had ongoing relationships with
the bank. 0 Therefore, they would have some shared expectations
and common experiences. Also, even with a first-time borrower, the
cases disprove the assumption that the bank merely presented the
borrower with a contract and the borrower signed it without any
understanding of the details of the transaction."'
It seems unlikely that a borrower would sign a demand note for
a significant amount of money (such as $3.5 million in K.M.C.),
and give the bank total control over the cash flow of his business,
without discussing the terms with the banker at all. This is, how-
ever, what Patterson would lead us to believe. For example, he
states that "the only clear or conscious expectation on the part of
the officers of the company [in K.M.C.] was that their operations
would be financed by Irving so long as they continued to make
their payments under the line of credit agreement." 2 However, he
provides no evidence to support this contention.
Furthermore, if we are to believe Patterson's other premise, that
88. Id at 144.
89. Id at 148.
90. See, for example, Kham, 908 F2d at 1353-54 (July 1981 to February 1984); First
Sec. Bank of Idaho, 765 P2d at 684 (1978 to 1983); Shiplet, 762 P2d at 243-44 (The court
stated that the borrowers "have done business with the Bank for a number of years."); and
Weinberg, 752 P2d at 722-23 (borrowers were engaged in financing activities from at least
1968 to 1974).
91. See, for example, Siegner, 820 P2d at 23.
92. Patterson, Good Faith and Lender Liability at 148 (cited in note 16).
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the debtor relies on ordinary life experience, not commercial so-
phistication," then we would have to conclude that the ordinary
meaning of the agreement is the meaning the debtor would have
assumed. If the debtor could not be expected to know the meaning
of terms from an "insider's" perspective, and cannot be held to the
same standard of "reasonableness" as the lender, then the meaning
of the terms must be their plain ordinary meaning. If this is true,
then it must follow that K.M.C., as an unsophisticated debtor,
would interpret "demand" as demand based on ordinary life exper-
iences, and would interpret the term "discretion" which gave Ir-
ving total discretion to advance funds to mean Irving had no re-
strictions. An ordinary, unsophisticated borrower who is not
familiar with bank practices would not know the banker's special
meaning for "demand" unless the banker so informed the bor-
rower. Similarly, an ordinary, unsophisticated borrower would not
know the banker's special meaning of "discretion" unless so
informed.
It does not matter that the parties do not have "shared expecta-
tions" in the sense that they are both sophisticated and knowl-
edgeable in the business of banking. What matters is what the
bank led the borrower to believe through its outward manifesta-
tions. The fact that a person is a small businessperson and not a
"sophisticated" financier does not mean that, at the time of the
agreement, the bank and the borrower did not reach an under-
standing about crucial terms that could have a significant impact
upon the continuing viability of the business.
In addition, even if the disagreement is over a term that was not,
as Patterson characterizes it, "thoroughly spelled out,"94 there is
still no reason to let the fact finder impose upon the parties its
idea of the most commercially reasonable agreement. The purpose
of interpretation is to determine the meaning that the borrower
gave to the bank's expressions, and to determine whether the bank
knew or should have known what the borrower understood. A
party should not be bound by a meaning not manifested by words
or conduct. Thus the fact finder should search for the meaning
given to the words by the parties even though not "sufficiently
spelled out."
Specifically, in K.M.C., the fact finder should have attempted to
determine whether Irving manifested any expressions that it had
93. Id at 145.
94. Id at 148.
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reason to know would be understood by K.M.C. to mean that Ir-
ving would not refuse to advance funds provided that K.M.C. con-
tinued to make timely payments on the interest, and provided that
Irving was adequately secured. If K.M.C. could not present any
relevant, credible evidence showing any such manifestation on Ir-
ving's part, Irving should not have been bound by the agreement
even if it seemed to be the most "commercially reasonable." If
K.M.C. could not present any evidence that Irving gave a meaning
to the agreement other than the usual meaning, or that Irving had
any reason to know that K.M.C. did so, then the express terms of
the written agreement were what should have been given effect.
They should have been given effect, however, because they were
the only manifestation of intent, not because the written word is
the only source of meaning. Furthermore, a court should always
test its conclusion that the express terms of the writing manifest
the agreement by going back to the bargaining and negotiating
stage to determine whether the parties were in fact using the words
in the usual context. More likely than not the lender will have
manifested some intent as to the meaning of crucial terms. For ex-
ample, although not ever mentioned in the court's analysis, Irving's
answer to K.M.C.'s complaint provided some information as to the
circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement. 5 If this
information had been pursued, other information would probably
have been discovered to aid the court in determining the intent of
the parties relating to the circumstances under which Irving could
refuse to advance funds.
It can be seen, then, that Patterson does not focus on a search
for the true agreement. He creates a hypothetical scenario which
may or may not coincide with the actual agreement of the parties.
Furthermore, even though a court should not rely totally upon the
express terms of the written agreement, neither should the agree-
ment be totally ignored, which is the result with Patterson's ap-
proach. If no evidence, intrinsic or extrinsic, is presented to negate
the written agreement, then the written agreement is all that the
courts should be able to enforce. However, the borrower should
first have an opportunity to present evidence of any outward mani-
festations of the lender that led the borrower to believe that the
agreement was something other than the plain meaning of the
written agreement. The job of the fact finder in commercial lend-
95. Answer of Defendant (K.M.C. Co., Inc. v Irving Trust Co.), reprinted in H. Chait-
man, Emerging Theories of Lender Liability, 1 ABA 587, 588-91 (1985).
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ing cases, as in other cases, is to find the truth. The fact finder,
whether judge or jury, must reach a conclusion as to the true
agreement of the parties, based on all the facts surrounding the
making of the agreement. The fact finder's job is not to listen to
two hypothetical stories and decide which one sounds more reason-
able: sometimes the true agreement is not the most reasonable
agreement (even though it may be reasonable in the context of
particular circumstances).96
II. THE CONTRADICTORY LAW OF CONTRACT VERSUS REALITY IN
THE WORLD OF COMMERCIAL LENDING
The recent explosion of the use of the implied duty of good faith
in lender liability cases is a phenomenon comparable to a similar
phenomenon explained in the late Grant Gilmore's "Death of Con-
tract. ' '97 Professor Gilmore asserted that equitable contract princi-
ples such as promissory estoppel, quasi-contract, substantial per-
formance, and impossibility of performance developed to protect
individuals who, under classical contract theory (particularly the
"bargain" theory of consideration), would otherwise have been de-
prived of protection. 8 For example, Gilmore averred that promis-
sory estoppel was originally used to protect those who had relied to
their detriment on precontractual or noncontractual representa-
tions.9 9 Similarly, Gilmore argued that courts turned to the quasi-
contract theory to protect individuals who had conferred benefits
on another who had not voluntarily assumed contractual obliga-
tions.00 Substantial performance, on the other hand, developed,
according to Gilmore, to protect individuals who had started but
had not quite completed performance, or whose performance was
defective in some minor way.' 0 Finally, Gilmore explained that the
doctrine of impossibility of performance arose to prevent the injus-
tice of the rule of absolute contractual liability.1
0 2
All of these doctrines or theories were "necessary to promote the
ends of justice" against classical contract law in which the empha-
sis was on formalism, certainty of meaning, and freedom of con-
96. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203 comment c (1979).
97. Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract at 72-74 (Ohio State University Press,
1974).
98. Gilmore, The Death of Contract at 63-64, 72-74, 80 (cited in note 97).
99. Id at 72.
100. Id at 73-74.
101. Id at 74.
102. Id at 80-81.
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tract."' 3 Unless the formalities were observed, there could be no
contract, and consequently, no liability. 10 " For example, the bar-
gain theory of consideration offered a means of escape from the
imposition of contractual liability, 10 5 and prevented recovery to a
promisee who suffered a detriment or conferred a benefit on an-
other because there was no "reciprocal conventional inducement,
each for the other, between consideration and promise."' 06 Like-
wise, formalistic rules, such as (1) the parol evidence rule; 0 7 (2) the
plain meaning rule, which requires consideration only of the plain
meaning of the express terms of the written contract;' °0 and (3) the
rule requiring definiteness and certainty of terms, 10' all of which
emphasize the written agreement over other manifestations of in-
tent, offered a means of escape to banks. Banks could hide behind
the formalism of the rules to prevent recovery to a borrower who
relied on manifestations of intent beyond the express terms of the
written agreement. Similarly, the equitable principle of good faith
has come into fashion in commercial loan cases as a way to prevent
unjust results caused by the existing formalism in contract law." 0
103. Id at 74. See also Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30
UCLA L Rev 829, 829-36 (1983).
104. Gilmore, The Death of Contract at 20 (cited in note 96).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. For good faith cases that have applied the parol evidence rule, see, for example,
First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 765 P2d at 686-87; Shiplet, 762 P2d at 245; and Academia, 802
SW2d at 291.
With regard to the parol evidence rule, it has been described by some commentators as:
"philosophically indefensible," (Levinson, 60 Tex L Rev at 378 n 18 (cited in note 11))
"troubling and controversial" (McIntosh, 35 Okla L Rev at 44 (cited in note 11)); and "fa-
miliar to many but fathomed by few" (John E. Murray, Jr., Murray on Contracts § 82 at
376 (3d ed 1990)). Any argument for its use can be easily refuted. The rule, it is said, pro-
tects the written agreement and provides that the borrower may not vary or expand the
agreement by introducing parol evidence to show understandings or antecedent agreements
which are in some way. contrary to the terms of the contract. Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts § 205. Moreover, as Professor Murray explains in his clarification of the parol evi-
dence rule, it is not really a rule of interpretation because it only determines what consti-
tutes the agreement. It does not tell us how to determine what words mean. However, courts
apply it incorrectly as a rule of interpretation. See John E. Murray, Jr., The Parol Evidence
Rule: A Clarification, 4 Duq L Rev 337, 338 (1965-66).
108. For good faith cases that have applied the plain meaning rule or a variation, see,
for example, Mirax Chem., 950 F2d at 569; Kham, 908 F2d at 1357; Flagship Nat'l Bank,
485 S2d at 1340-41; and Garrett, 459 NW2d at 845.
109. For good faith cases that have required more certain and definite terms, see, for
example, Union State Bank v Woell, 434 NW2d 712, 717 (ND 1989); Siegner, 820 P2d at
28-29; and Garrett, 459 NW2d at 839.
110. Professors McCormick and Wigmore attribute the survival of formalism in the
area of the parol evidence rule to the mistrust of juries. Charles T. McCormick, The Parol
Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury, 41 Yale L J 365, 369 n 8
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The problem with the existing formalism is that it erroneously
assumes a society "composed of independent, freedom-seeking in-
dividuals, each of whom avidly pursues his own self-interests,'"' is
highly responsive to the incentive or threat of contract rules,"'2 and
enters into transactions only after "careful bargaining." ' 3 Addi-
tionally, just as the classical contract principles discussed by Gil-
more "had nothing to do with the real world,"11 4 neither do the
formalistic rules, which elevate the importance of the written docu-
ment in the lender liability cases, reflect the realities of present
day banking practices. Notably, when the transaction underlying
the agreement at issue is a commercial loan transaction, courts and
commentators stress the importance of the writing more than in
other transactions.1
15
The reasons given by courts and commentators for applying the
formalistic rules tend to be some variation of the unfounded, un-
proven fear that, at worst, banks will stop lending money if they
cannot rely solely upon the written language in their agreements,
or, at best, the cost of lending money will increase to the point that
marginal borrowers will never be able to obtain a loan.11 In other
words, banks must be able to rely upon the illusion of certainty
and predictability of the written word whether it accurately repre-
sents the agreement or not; otherwise, economic life as we now
(1932). This premise is supported by the virtual disappearance of the parol evidence rule in
modern English law, concomitant with the virtual disappearance of the use of jury trials.
See generally P.S. Atiyah, Essays on Contract 116 (Oxford University Press 1986) on the
disappearance of the parol evidence rule. See generally Terence Ingman, The English Legal
Process 16 (3d ed 1990) and R.J. Walker, The English Legal System 245 (6th ed 1985) on
the disappearance of jury trials.
Mistrust of the jury also explains retention of the rules which give effect to the plain
meaning of the express terms of the written contract. Only if interpretation of a contract
depends on extrinsic evidence will the trier of fact be required to perform. John E. Murray,
Jr., Murray on Contracts, § 86 at 405-06 (3d ed 1990) (cited in note 107).
111. Feinman, 30 UCLA L Rev at 832 (cited in note 103).
112. Id at 844.
113. Id at 855.
114. Gilmore, The Death of Contract at 7 (cited in note 96).
115. See, for example, Savers Fed. Say. & Loan v Home Fed. Say. & Loan, 721 F
Supp 940, 943 (WD Tenn 1989)("Typically, agreement is evidenced by signed documents,
especially in the world of commercial loans").
116. For cases and commentary espousing or discussing this view, see, for example,
Fasolino Foods Co., Inc. v Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 961 F2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir 1992);
Badgett v Security State Bank, 116 Wash 2d 563, 807 P2d 356, 361 n 3 (1991); David
Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions In Commercial Relationships, 104 Harv L Rev, 374, 457
(1990); Janine S. Hiller, Good Faith Lending, 26 Am Bus L J, 783, 802 (1988); Comment,
What's So Good About Good Faith? The Good Faith Performance Obligation in Commer-
cial Lending, 55 U Chi L Rev, 1335, 1338 (1988).
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know it will cease to exist.117 This premise has never been substan-
tiated. In fact, the evidence available from a similar premise indi-
cates that this argument is fallacious.
In the 1960's, new regulations were adopted which preserved
consumer claims and defenses against a holder in due course who
purchased a negotiable instrument relating to a consumer transac-
tion. 11 8 Opponents gave "dire warnings" that consumer credit
would dry up without holder in due course immunity."119 As the
current exorbitant amount of consumer debt illustrates, 20 this dire
prediction, which also had no factual support, was never real-
ized. 21 (Perhaps many consumers and the economy would be in
better financial shape if it had.)
In addition, because so many variables affect the decision of a
bank loan officer to lend money,122 it is not reasonable to argue
that only one variable, particularly the law of contract, will be the
deciding factor, if it is a factor at all. In fact, the following factors
are listed as "Typical factors a loan officer considers: 'He cheats on
his wife.' 'He wears white shoes.' 'He is too ready to buy the
drinks.' 'Never lend to a [insert 'plumber,' 'lawyer,'
'salesman,' or other category of business person that has burned
the loan officer in the past].' "23
Nevertheless, it is the position of this article,1 ' that one of the
main reasons for the "overriding sacredness of the documenta-
tion" 2 5 is that courts are unfamiliar with the way bankers and
commercial borrowers actually contract. As Professor Murray as-
serts: "In such cases [where judges and lawyers lack familiarity
with the type of transaction underlying the agreement], there is a
tendency to ignore the realities of the surrounding circumstances
117. See Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexi-
ties of Contract, 11 Law & Soc'y Rev, 507, 523 (1977).
118. Ellen R. Jordan, "Just Sign Here - It's Only a Formality": Parol Evidence in the
Law of Commercial Paper, 13 Ga L Rev 53, 59 (1978).
119. Jordan, 13 Ga L Rev at 59 (cited in note 118).
120. Abstract, U.S. Household Debt Grew Substantially, Wall St J at As (April 10,
1991).
121. White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 14-1 at 614 (cited in note 23).
122. See for example, Gene R. Barrett, What Bankers Want to Know Before Granting
a Small Business Loan, Journal of Accountancy 47 (Apr 1990)("Bankers use the "six C's of
credit (to evaluate a borrower) - credit, capital, coverage, capacity, circumstances, collat-
eral and character."); Louis Uchitelle, Bankers Expected to Stay Hesitant to Lend for
Years, N Y Times at Al col 6 (July 5, 1991)("Many factors affect a bank's willingness to
lend, from the health of the bank to the size of its underlying capital base.")
123. Dolan, Fundamentals of Commefcial Activity § 12-3 at 266 (cited in note 44).
124. See note 7 and accompanying text.
125. Murray, 51 Or L Rev at 296 (cited in note 7)'
Vol. 31:729
Commercial Loan Agreements
and cling to the documents as sacred . . . [C]ourts resort to docu-
ments exclusively where they are totally unfamiliar with the be-
havior patterns of the parties in a particular transaction. ' ' 126 Fur-
thermore, determining the agreement by considering all of the
circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement is, in fact,
a very difficult task requiring "severe discipline" and the "irritable
reaching after fact and reason." '127 Obviously, it is much easier
mechanically to determine the "plain" meaning of the express
terms of the written agreement, or creatively to decide what the
equitable, reasonable agreement demonstrating good faith would
be than to gather and weigh all of the evidence relating to the cir-
cumstances under which the agreement was made.
Despite the various reasons for applying the formalistic rules,
however, any satisfactory method of interpreting commercial loan
agreements must acknowledge that much significant economic be-
havior takes place almost untouched by contract norm. Few
nonlawyers know much about or pay much attention to the con-
tent of the formal norms when they negotiate agreements. 28 The
empirical picture of the contract process differs sharply from the
classical model which assumes that contracts are carefully drafted
and negotiated with input from both parties, and that the parties
have read it, have understood it, and have understood that their
agreement is based upon the literal meaning of the express terms
of this written contract.
1 29
Instead, many times, the written terms are ignored or are used
in a way that does not reflect their literal, plain meaning. The bor-
rower's understanding of the agreement is based upon oral state-
ments from the loan officer representing the bank, who tells the
borrower that certain language can be ignored, or that the lan-
guage means something other than its plain, literal meaning. Many
times the borrower is led to believe that the terms used are just a
formality.
For example, in First Security Bank of Idaho (the "Bank") v
Gaige,130 the owner of a business signed a personal guaranty to
guarantee payment of his company's debt. He was told by the
126. Id at 290-91.
127. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation at ix (cited in note 8).
128. See generally Macaulay, 11 Law & Soc'y Rev at 523 (cited in note 117); Charny,
104 Harv L Rev at 376 (cited in note 116); and Feinman, 30 UCLA L Rev at 851 (cited in
note 103).
129. Macaulay, Law & Soc'y Rev at 508-09 (cited in note 117).
130. 115 Idaho 172, 765 P2d 683 (1988).
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Bank's loan officer that the guaranty was a mere formality; the
Bank would satisfy the company debt from company assets before
pursuing payment under the guaranty. 131 Nevertheless, the Bank
later demanded payment under the personal guaranty before ex-
hausting all of the company's assets.1"2 When the guarantor sued
and tried to admit the loan officer's statements, both the trial
court and the appellate court held that the statements were not
admissible under the parol evidence rule because they would mod-
ify the terms of the written agreement.13 In addition, in response
to the guarantor's claim that the Bank breached its duty of good
faith, the court ruled that it did not breach any duty "by merely
exercising its express rights under the guaranty agreement."' 34
Similarly, in Siegner v Interstate Prod. Credit Ass'n ("Inter-
state"),13 5 two ranchers, whose business was solicited by Inter-
state's loan officer, were told that the fact that their loan was
structured for one year was a formality and that Interstate would
roll over the balance from year to year under the same terms until
the loan was paid off. The ranchers were assured that Interstate
was prepared to stay with the plaintiffs for the "long haul."' 6 Also,
the ranchers were told that the language requiring them to inject
cash into the ranch if the loan margin fell below acceptable levels
was a mere formality and nothing to worry about. 37 Notwithstand-
ing these comforting words of assurance, every time the loan came
up for annual renewal, the bank changed the relationship or im-
posed new conditions on the ranchers. 38 Finally, after about seven
renewals and seven concomitant changes, when the bank began to
demand liquidation of cattle, the ranchers sued the bank claiming
breach of the implied duty of good faith.'39 The defense was typi-
cal of banks caught in this type of situation: the bank claimed that
the implied duty of good faith claim should have been excluded
because if the bank's performance was in compliance with the writ-
ten documents, it could not have been in bad faith.4 0
Despite the good faith claim (which, as is normally the case, was
131. Gaige, 765 P2d at 686.
132. Id at 684.
133. Id at 686-87.
134. Id at .687.
135. 190 Or App 417, 820 P2d 20 (1991).
136. Siegner, 820 P2d at 23.
137. Id.
138. Id at 24.
139. Id at 24-25.
140. Id at 31.
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unnecessary), the court recognized that the major underlying issue
was the parol evidence rule; that is, whether evidence of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the agreement and of the alleged oral
agreement should have been excluded."" The court then engaged
in a lengthy, complex analysis under the parol evidence rule in or-
der to permit the evidence extrinsic to the written agreement, and
concluded that the bank breached the alleged oral agreement." 's
With respect to the superfluous good faith claim, the court's re-
sponse to the bank's defense was basically that a breach of the
duty of good faith could be found because the bank breached the
alleged oral agreement.
143
Conversely, in Shiplet v First Security Bank of Livingston 144
(the "Bank,") the Montana Supreme Court based its opinion only
on the written document and ruled against the borrower. The
agreement between the Bank and the Shiplets was in the form of a
one-year promissory note at an interest rate of ten percent.145 Ap-
parently, the Bank led the Shiplets to believe that the terms in a
"Request for Guarantee" to the Farmers Home Administration
("FmHA") would also be the terms of the agreement between the
Bank and the Shiplets, including the term which provided for a
ten percent rate of interest for five years.14 After the first note, the
parties entered into a cycle of notes, most of which were issued for
six-month terms. 14 7 The interest rate on subsequent notes fluctu-
ated as the prime lending rate rose and fell, reaching a peak of
twenty-one and one-half per cent. 148 When the Shiplets sued for
breach of contract, the court would not admit any of the Bank's
statements regarding the five-year interest rate agreement because
the "oral representations made by the Bank prior to signing [the
note] merged with the note's terms. ' 14 9 Despite the court's admis-
sion that the bank made statements that were "not always strictly
forthright," 150 the court would not admit any evidence supporting
the five-year agreement because it was "evidence of prior oral
agreements [which] is not admissible for the purpose of altering
141. Id at 25.
142. Id at 25-28.
143. Id at 31-32.
144. 234 Mont 166, 762 P2d 242 (1988).




149. Id at 245-46.
150. Id at 246.
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subsequent written agreements dealing with the same subject. ' 1" 1
The court concluded that the only agreement between the parties
was the written promissory note for one year and, since raising the
interest rates was not a violation of the guaranty with the FmHA,
the Bank was not prohibited from raising the interest rate after
the one year note terminated, despite the Bank's oral statements
which were not always "forthright" with the Shiplets about the fu-
ture interest rates.
152
In addition to claiming breach of contract, the Shiplets also
claimed that the bank breached the implied duty of good faith.153
This claim of course was unessential since the court characterized
the "gravamen" of the claim as whether the terms of the agree-
ment were carried out faithfully.'" Obviously, this is no different
than the breach of contract claim, and begs the threshold question;
namely, what is the agreement? Again relying on the express terms
of the written note, the court simply proclaimed that:
[T]he various notes evidencing agreement between the Bank and the
Shiplets were in fact carried out by the Bank. The monies agreed upon were
advanced at the rates agreed upon in writing by both parties. Statements
made by the Bank's agent, while not always strictly forthright, did not de-
prive Shiplets of the benefit of the bargains they struck with the Bank.15
Cases similar to the three cases described above, in which bor-
rowers are led to believe that the express terms of the written
agreement are not representative of the true agreement, reflect the
realities of the commercial world where "businessmen are inclined
to believe soothing words from too helpful bankers."'' 6 Moreover,
even the statements of bankers and commentary directed to bank
loan officers indicate that loan officers do not take the language in
loan agreements literally, and that the non-literal meaning is con-
veyed to and taken seriously by the borrowers. For example, one
bank president testified, "based on his knowledge of banking prac-
tices," that in the absence of a time term in a demand note, the
likelihood was that the schedule for repayment of the principal was
governed by a verbal agreement between the loan officer and the
151. Id at 245.




156. Jordan, 13 Ga L Rev at 78 (cited in note 118). See also Charny, 104 Harv L Rev
at 458 (cited in note 116)(arguing. that borrowers may misapprehend the nature of the lend-
ing relationship and that such misapprehension may often be encouraged by lenders).
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debtor.117 Similarly, another bank president testified that a banker
is required to give notice before termination of financing, even if
the written document does not require notice.15 Furthermore, the
United States Banker warns: "Make certain that legal documents
clearly reflect the understandings between the parties. Telling a
borrower that provisions of the agreement 'aren't really enforced,'
or 'are just there for the lawyers' is a big mistake.
'159
Despite these words of warning, the cases discussed' 60 indicate
that bank loan officers do make oral representations in violation of
the advice set forth above. Then, when the borrower relies on these
oral representations, the bank will "scrambl[e] for a loophole, a
tactic, which violates the expectations that the other party views as
justified."' 6' Almost always the bank will want the court to deter-
mine the agreement based on the plain meaning of the express
terms of the written agreement or will rely on the parol evidence
rule or both. In response, because he is restricted by the formalistic
rules of contract and cannot present evidence extrinsic to the writ-
ten agreement, the borrower will claim that, notwithstanding the
terms of the written agreement, the bank has breached the duty of
good faith and fair dealing that is implied in every contract. Some
empathetic judges will agree with the borrower. Nevertheless,
neither approach is satisfactory because, as illustrated below, both
ignore the real agreement of the parties, which can only be deter-
mined by looking at all of the circumstances surrounding the writ-
ten agreement, including the written agreement itself.""
The two contradictory patterns of analysis just discussed are an
example of what "might be expected from the contradictory nature
of the modern law's retention and rejection of the classical image
in its response to the problems of classical contract law."1 63
Modern contract law . . .embodies two general, contradictory patterns of
analysis ... One pattern is heir to the individualist tradition of the classi-
cal image. It proposes a world of autonomous, freedom-seeking beings and a
body of contract law which aids them in their search. The other pattern is
157. Reid, 821 F2d at 14.
158. K.M.C., 757 F2d at 761.
159. An Action Checklist for the Lender, US Banker at 22 (May 1986).
160. See notes 130-55 and accompanying text.
161. Macaulay, 11 Law & Soc'y Rev at 513 (cited in note 117).
162. See notes 168-202 and accompanying text.
163. Feinman, 30 UCLA L Rev at 838 (cited in note 103).
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its collectivist opposite. This pattern envisions a world of interdependent,
cooperating actors and a body of contract law which encourages their
cooperation."8 4
Gilmore has also noted that the rejection of classical theory pro-
ceeds in a "confused and sprawling pattern . . . .
Thus, the pattern of analysis using the implied duty of good
faith (the second collectivist pattern) is, in large part, an attempt
(not necessarily a conscious one) to escape the unjust results
caused by the formalism of classical contract law which elevates
the written document to an inviolate status.1 6 "Each pattern
presents only a partially true picture of the social order ...
neither pattern is an adequate basis for contract law and . the
two together are contradictory. ' 16 7 As stated throughout this arti-
cle, in most of the lender liability cases resorting to the implied
duty of good faith, what is really at issue is the meaning the bor-
rower and the lender gave to the words of the written document.
Usually, however, the borrower cannot successfully present evi-
dence of all of the circumstances surrounding the agreement due to
the existing formalism in contract interpretation. This inability to
produce extrinsic evidence produces unjust or illogical results. The
reaction to these unjust and illogical results in the case of lender
liability cases is to resort to the implied duty of good faith; how-
ever, this reaction does not necessarily reflect the expectations of
the parties either, and sometimes results in creating duties for the
bank to which the bank never agreed. Thus, this approach can also
result in unjust and illogical results.
The case of Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v First Bank of
Whiting (the "Bank")16 8 will be used to demonstrate the thesis of
164. Id.
165. Gilmore, The Death of Contract at 74, 98-100 (cited in note 97).
166. This is supported by the fact that England, unlike the United States, does not
recognize a general obligation to observe good faith in the performance of a contract. More-
over, in England, unlike the United States, "[w]hen it is argued that a written contract is
not conclusive of the obligations of the parties, the court seems simply to balance the argu-
ments for and against imposing an orally derived obligation on a party, rather than treat the
writing as conclusive ...." Atiyah, Essays On Contract at 116 (cited in note 110). In other
words, because in England parties to a contract are not restricted to the written document
to explain their agreement, but rather are able to present evidence of the surrounding cir-
cumstances, they do not have to rely upon the equitable principle of good faith to have their
reasonable expectations satisfied.
167. Feinman, 30 UCLA L Rev at 839 (cited in note 103).
168. 908 F2d 1351 (7th Cir 1990), rev'g, 104 Bankr 909 (ND Ill 1989), aft'g, 97 Bankr
420 (ND Ill 1989). See also Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh Circuit: Frank
Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 Iowa L Rev 503 (1991) where Patterson critically analyzes
Easterbrook's opinion in Kham. Although this author agrees with Patterson's charges of
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this article. Kham was a bankruptcy case in which Kham & Nate's
Shoes (the "Debtor") sought to equitably subordinate the Bank's
claim based on bad faith termination of a line of credit.169 The
Debtor also brought counterclaims against the Bank alleging
breach of contract and breach of the implied duty of good faith.
170
The Debtor operated a retail shoe business in Chicago, Illinois, and
the Bank, which was located in Indiana, had first extended credit
to the Debtor in July 1981.7 In the fall of 1983, the owners of the
Debtor met with a Mr. Donald Cassaday, a senior vice president of
the Bank, concerning a loan to ease its cash flow problems. 72 The
Bank then issued several unsecured letters of credit in favor of the
Debtor's creditors. 73 Subsequently, in December 1983, the Debtor
requested additional credit.7 4 At that meeting, Mr. Cassaday enu-
merated several conditions upon which the Bank would approve a
$300,000 line of credit for working capital to sustain the Debtor's
business. 175 The Bank articulated the conditions in a commitment
letter sent to the Debtor January 4, 1984. In the letter, the Bank
agreed to lend up to $300,000 in a line of credit as an interim loan
on the condition that the Debtor file for relief under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code and grant the Bank a superpriority lien on
essentially all of the Debtor's post-petition assets. The ultimate
plan was for a $1.2 million Small Business Administration guaran-
teed loan.
17 6
After the Debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition on January 29, 1984,
the bankruptcy court entered an order approving the line of credit
and granting the Bank's superpriority lien.'7 7 On January 23, 1984,
the Debtor and Bank signed their loan agreement which opened a
$300,000 line of credit. The agreement provided for cancellation on
five days' notice and added "nothing provided herein shall consti-
tute a waiver of the right of the Bank to terminate financing at any
time. 1' 7 8 The Bank advanced approximately $100,000 to the
formalism against Judge Easterbrook, she disagrees with many of Patterson's other prem-
ises. See notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
169. Kham, 97 Bankr at 423-24.
170. Id at 424.
171. Id at 421-22.
172. Id.





178. Kham, 908 F2d at 1353.
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Debtor. Most of these funds were used to repay credit extended by
way of draws on the letters of credit issued by the Bank prepeti-
tion. Thus, the Bank acquired a postpetition lien on previously
unencumbered assets of the Debtor in order to pay a pre-petition,
unsecured obligation.
1 79
Around February 14, 1984, the Bank's Board of Loan and In-
vestment Committee ("BLIC") directed Cassaday to terminate the
line of credit. The reason given was that the BLIC did not like the
nature of the credit with the Debtor, did not like the location of
the Debtor's business, and did not think that the Bank should be
doing business on the south side of Chicago. 180 Although the Bank
decided to terminate the line of credit on February 14, 1984, it did
not inform the Debtor until two weeks later. In fact, counsel for
the Bank attended a creditor's meeting, fully aware of the Bank's
decision to terminate, and failed to mention the Bank's decision
while affirming to those present that the court had entered the Fi-
nancing Order approving the Loan and Security Agreement.' 8'
On February 29, 1984, some 30 days from the effective date of
the Loan and Security Agreement, the Bank notified the Debtor in
writing that it intended to terminate the line of credit with five
days' notice. The Bank gave the Debtor no reason for the termina-
tion in its written notice. There had been no material change of
circumstances between the time the Bank and the Debtor entered
into the Loan and Security Agreement and the date on which the
Bank terminated the agreement. The Debtor was current in its
payment without any difficulty whatsoever. 182 Several weeks later,
the Bank's President told one of the Debtor's owners that he did
not understand why the Debtor had come to Indiana for financing,
that the Bank did not want to do business with the Debtor, and
that the Debtor should go back to its own neighborhood to obtain
financing.1 83 An alternative reason for the termination was sug-
gested in the President's deposition wherein he indicated that
there was an internal conflict at the Bank between Cassaday and
the President.
84
After the Bank terminated the line of credit, the Debtor was un-
able to borrow funds from other sources because its assets were
179. Kham, 97 Bankr at 422.
180. Id.






encumbered by the Bank's lien. As a result, the Debtor sustained
substantial damage to its business. The Debtor had to close stores
and cancel plans to open a new one. Subsequently, the Debtor filed
an amended plan of reorganization requesting equitable subordina-
tion of the Bank's claim alleging bad faith termination of the line
of credit.185 After the bankruptcy court granted the Debtor's re-
quest, the Debtor counterclaimed alleging breach of the implied
duty of good faith and breach of contract.186
Relying on Illinois law, the bankruptcy court ruled in favor of
the Debtor on its counterclaims and granted the Debtor's motion
for summary judgment. 1 7 Although addressing the claim of breach
of good faith separately from the claim of breach of contract, the
court's analysis indicated the inessential nature of the good faith
claim. The court first addressed the claim of the breach of the duty
of good faith. It held that the Bank breached its duty of good faith,
reasoning that it:
knew or should have known that its conduct would adversely affect the
Debtor's financial condition, that the Bank was aware of the Debtor's condi-
tion and of the impact that termination of the line of credit would have
upon the Debtor and its creditors, and [because] the Bank's conduct
manifests a disregard for the Debtor's reorganization case.'88
Later in the opinion, under Count III-Breach of Contract, the
court ruled that Illinois state law imposes on lenders a contractual
duty to act in good faith. 189 The court further opined that good
faith in the context of termination of a loan agreement means that
the termination must be in accord with reasonable expectations of
the parties.190 Then, without any investigation into what the rea-
sonable expectations of the parties were, the court concluded that
the Bank's termination was not in good faith "as there existed no
valid business reason to terminate the line of credit because the
bank was fully secured, received timely payment on ifs debt, and
had the complete cooperation of the Debtor."1 91
.In the Bank's appeal of the bankruptcy court's order for equita-
ble subordination, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court
185. Id at 423-24.
186. Id at 424.
187. Id at 421, 426. Summary judgment was granted because the issues were the same
as those involved in the equitable subordination hearing in which the court concluded that
the Bank terminated the line of credit agreement in bad faith.
188. Id at 427.





of Appeals vacated and remanded the decision of the bankruptcy
court, ruling in favor of the Bank. 192 Despite "not doubt[ing] the
force of the proverb that the letter killeth, while the spirit giveth
life" and acknowledging that "literal implementation of unadorned
language may destroy the essence of the venture,"' 9 s the court nev-
ertheless proceeded on a road to destruction by relying solely upon
the literal interpretation of the unadorned language. The court did
recognize the duty of good faith. Its definition of good faith
strongly resembled that of Burton. 94 The court asserted: "Good
faith is a compact reference to an implied undertaking not to take
opportunistic advantage in a way that could not have been con-
templated at the time of drafting, and which therefore was not re-
solved explicitly by the parties."' 95 Nevertheless, the court did not
examine any conduct that occurred at the time of the drafting, in-
stead basing its reasoning solely on the written words of the
agreement:
Firms that have negotiated contracts are entitled to enforce them to the
letter ...without being muleted for lack of 'good faith' . . . Debtor and
Bank signed a contract expressly allowing the Bank to cease making further
advances. The $300,000 was the maximum loan, not a guarantee. The Bank
exercised its contractual privilege after loaning Debtor $75,000; it made a
clean break and did not demand improved terms. It had the right to do this
for any reason satisfactory to itself.'
6
The appellate court criticized the bankruptcy court for adding
an overlay of "just cause" to the exercise of contractual privilege
because such an overlay would "reduce commercial certainty and
breed costly litigation." ' Furthermore, conceding that the Bank's
decision did leave the Debtor "scratching for other sources of
credit," the court asserted that the Bank did not create Debtor's
need for funds, and it was not contractually obliged to satisfy its
customer's desires. "If Kham & Nate's Shoes did not like that op-
192. Kham, 908 F2d at 1363. Between the bankruptcy court's and the Seventh Circuit
Court's opinions was the opinion of the district court on the equitable subordination issue.
Kham, 104 Bankr at 909. Although the district court affirmed the order for equitable subor-
dination, it framed the issue in terms of whether the Bank "engaged in fraud, overreaching
or spoliation" rather than bad faith because "a claimant's conduct must amount to more
than a lack of good faith in order to warrant equitable subordination to his claim." Id at
913. The district court relied on the same facts as the bankruptcy court to conclude that the
Bank's actions rose to the higher standard. Id.
193. Kham, 908 F2d at 1357.
194. See notes 61-70 and accompanying text.





tion, it was entitled to shop around."198
The reasoning of both courts is flawed. First, neither the bank-
ruptcy court opinion nor the circuit court analysis demonstrates
any awareness of the empirical picture of the contract process. The
bankruptcy court opinion is representative of the collectivist pat-
tern of analysis that "envisions a world of interdependent, cooper-
ating actors and a body of contract law which encompasses their
cooperation. 1 99 According to the bankruptcy court, the Bank
should not have done anything that could have adversely affected
the Debtor's financial condition. Since the Debtor was being coop-
erative, as all good contractors should, so should the Bank have
been cooperative, whether or not its cooperation would have re-
flected the agreement. Conversely, the circuit court's reasoning re-
flects the individualistic tradition of the classical image, a world in
which individualism, certainty of meaning, and freedom of contract
prevail. According to the circuit court, unless written agreements
are enforced according to their express terms, "the institution of
contract, with all the advantages private negotiation and agree-
ment brings, is jeopardized. '"200
In addition to a lack of awareness of the empirical nature of the
contract process, neither decision relies on any evidence outside
the written agreement to determine what the parties' expectations
were regarding the termination provision. The issue that should
have been addressed is, based on the manifestations of the Bank,
what did the Debtor believe would trigger termination by the
Bank? The bankruptcy court seems simply to assume that the
plain, literal meaning of the written agreement could not possibly
reflect the expectations of the borrower, and the circuit court sim-
ply assumes that it does. Evidence outside the written agreement
should have been considered, particularly specific evidence relating
to the negotiations and communications surrounding the termina-
tion provision of the Loan and Security Agreement. Although it
appears that no specific evidence of such a nature was presented,
one should not assume that none was available. This author would
suggest that the borrower was dissuaded from even attempting to
introduce any oral testimony due to the strict application of the
parol evidence rule in Illinois.2°' Thus, the borrower had to rely
198. Id at 1358.
199. See notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
200. Kham, 908 F2d at 1357.
201. See, for example, Main Bank of Chicago v Baker, 86 Il 2d 188, 427 NE2d 94, 98-
99 (1981); Land of Lincoln Say. and Loan v Michigan Ave. Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 103 I1
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inappropriately on the equitable principle of good faith. Notwith-
standing the lack of any specific evidence, there was some evidence
indicating that the Debtor was led to believe that the Bank would
not suddenly terminate the loan agreement for nonfinancial rea-
sons. Apparently, the Bank led the Debtor to believe (1) that the
ultimate plan was to reorganize the Debtor and (2) that the
$300,000 line of credit was an interim loan until the Debtor ob.-
tained a Small Business Administration guaranteed loan.2 °2 It does
not seem likely that the Debtor would file for bankruptcy and con-
vert unsecured debt to secured debt if it expected the Bank imme-
diately to terminate the loan agreement without the Debtor having
any alternative financing. Evidence relating to the Debtor's expec-
tation on termination was required to effectuate a just result.
In sum, the formalistic rules of contract, which interfere with the
determination of the real manifested agreement of the parties, are
based on values that supported the classical theory of contract,
such as certainty of meaning, individualism, and freedom of con-
tract. The rules do not reflect the realities of present banking prac-
tices and thus result in unjust results. The implied duty of good
faith is a way to overcome the unjust results; however, relying on
the implied duty of good faith is, at best, superfluous and, at worst,
unjust. This current approach to deciding the lender liability cases
involving interpretation of commercial loan documents fails to pro-
vide meaningful guidance. Thus, what is needed is a coherent stan-
dard of the discipline of interpretation that reflects current bank-
ing practices and determines the meaning intended by the parties
by considering all of the circumstances surrounding the agreement.
These principles are not new. They reflect those espoused by
Professor Corbin in his treatise published in 1951.203 Nevertheless,
based on the cases which do not reflect commercial reality and do
not result in enforcing the true agreement, these principles obvi-
ously need further reinforcement. Thus, the next section will dis-
cuss a process of interpretation that reflects current business prac-
tices and that considers and weighs all of the relevant evidence
surrounding an agreement. As explained20 4 the process is based on
the hermeneutic principles of the literary theorist, E.D. Hirsch,
App 3d 1095, 432 NE2d 378, 383 (1982); see also State Nat'l Bank v Academia, Inc., 802
SW2d at 291 (applying Illinois law).
202. See notes 171-79 and accompanying text.
203. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts Ch 24 (cited in note 11). See also Corbin, 50 Cornell
L Q at 161 (cited in note 11).
204. See notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
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whose principles are strikingly similar to Corbin's principles of
contract interpretation.0 5 Because of its emphasis on authorial in-
tent, Hirsch's theory lends itself well to contract interpretation (as
opposed to statutory or constitutional interpretation). With con-
tract interpretation, the interpreter does not encounter the prob-
lem of determining the "collective" intention of a collegiate body
as with statutes and constitutions.0 6 Moreover, contrary to what
some commentators have written about Hirsch's theory, Hirsch
does not have specific rules and methods.'07 The only methods ad-
vocated by Hirsch are those for weighing evidence. Hirsch believes
that, "While there is not and cannot be any method or model of
correct interpretation, there can be a ruthlessly critical process of
validation to which many skills and many hands may
contribute. '"2 0 8
III. HIRSCH'S PROCESS AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION
According to Hirsch, there are two stages in interpretation. The
first is the unmethodical and intuitive stage. It usually results in a
mistaken guess. This stage is necessary, maintains Hirsch, for a be-
ginning. The second stage is the more critical stage. At this stage,
the methodical activity begins. This is where the conclusion
reached by the first stage is tested and criticized against all the
relevant knowledge.0 9
The first intuitive stage is the point at which many courts stop.
They determine meaning only from the writing itself. According to
Hirsch, this leads to "semantic autonomy" which, in turn, leads to
much of our present day theoretical confusion. 10 Hirsch believes
that there is no logical reason to stop here,'21 1 and explains that
semantic autonomy is based on the fallacy that there is public con-
205. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts Ch 24 (cited in note 11); Corbin, 50 Cornell L Q at
161 (cited in note 11).
206. See, for example, McIntosh, 35 Okla L Rev at 4 (cited in note 12): "It remains to
be asked, however, whether the norm Hirsch suggests would serve any practical value in
legal hermeneutics because in law what we invariably encounter when we speak of authorial
intention is the collective intention of a collegiate body."
207. See, for example, Sherman, 51 Mod L Rev at 388 (cited in note 12) who states
that for Hirsch, "hermeneutics is the body of methodological principles that underlies valid
interpretation"; and Phelps and Pitts, 29 SLU L Rev at 354 (cited in note 10) who state that
Hirsch sees "hermeneutics as a search for methods of valid interpretation."
208. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation at 206 (cited in note 8).
209. Id at 203-04.
210. Id at 1-5. Similarly, in his article criticizing the parol evidence rule, Corbin refers
to this as hitting the "semantic stone wall." Corbin, 50 Cornell L Q at 187 (cited in note 11).
211. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation at 2 (cited in note 8).
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sensus as to meaning."' This is not to say that an author can at-
tach any meaning she wants to a word. Hirsch believes that norms
of language exert a powerful influence and impose an unavoidable
limitation on both author and interpreter. 13 Nevertheless, the
norms of language are not uniform or stable but vary with the par-
ticular sort of utterance that is to be interpreted.
21 4
Because the norms or "ground rules" of language vary greatly, it
is not impossible that one person can be playing by a different set
of rules than the other. Therefore, Hirsch postulates that the deci-
sive element in interpretation is shareability. Accordingly, he
maintains that what we are searching for in interpretation is
shared verbal meaning, that is, whatever someone has willed to
convey by a particular sequence of linguistic signs which can be
conveyed (shared) by means of these linguistic signs.2"' By refer-
ring to someone's "will to convey," Hirsch is not implying that
meaning is determined only by what is in someone's mind. He does
not require a "meeting of the minds" as implied by one commenta-
tor. 21" Hirsch asserts that "[i]t betrays a totally inadequate concep-
tion of verbal meaning to equate it with what the author has in
mind."
2 7
One cannot convey a particular meaning to another if the other
person is not familiar with a particular meaning. Thus, under-
standing can only occur if the interpreter proceeds under the same
system of expectations as the author. Transference of meaning
from author to interpreter can be achieved only if the author is
familiar with typical past usages and experiences common to him-
212. Id at 13.
213. Id at 27.
214. Id at 30-31. Corbin also criticizes this approach to interpretation, asserting that it
is erroneous to assume uniformity and certainty in language. Corbin, 50 Cornell L Q at 161
(cited in note 11).
215. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation at 31 (cited in note 8).
216. See McIntosh, 35 Okla L Rev at 36-37 (cited in note 12).
217. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation at 31 (cited in note 8). Corbin also recognizes
the varied ground rules of language: "In interpreting written words, a party may always
prove that they were to him a foreign tongue, that they are the words of a professor of
philosophy and he is only a peasant, that they are the language of a lawyer and he is only a
professor of philosophy." Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 543 at 151 (cited in note 11).
Corbin also acknowledges the importance of the concept of shareability of meaning. For
example, he asserts that "it is not the meaning of a 'reasonably intelligent man' or of a
'normal user of English' that the court is trying to discover and make effective... The court
will give legal effect to the words of a contract in accordance with the meaning actually
given to them by one of the parties, if the other knew or had reason to know that he did so."
Id § 543 at 140. Thus, for Corbin, the meaning of the words of the contract is the meaning
shared by the two parties. Id.
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self and his interpreter. By virtue of shared past experiences, the
type of meaning he expects to convey will be the type of meaning
his interpreter will also be led to expect. This is not to say that the
author and interpreter must have had extensive shared past exper-
iences. All that need occur is that the interpreter must in some
way learn the different meanings of words. Or, as Hirsch explains
it, the interpreter must learn the characteristics of a certain type,
for characteristics are not usually "syncategorematic" or absolutely
necessary comeanings. 1 8 Nevertheless, it is sufficient merely to
give the interpreter a decisive clue as to the particular meaning
that is intended.219
Neither Hirsch nor Corbin claims that absolute certainty of the
shared meaning can be achieved. Claims need to be moderated to
reflect the peculiarities and difficulties attending the interpretive
enterprise.220 Therefore, both speak in terms of probabilities.2 21
Hirsch chides us, however, that notwithstanding lack of certainty,
we should not reach the "overly hasty conclusion that the author's
intended meaning is inaccessible and is therefore a useless object
of interpretation. ' ' 222 We can reach and agree on the most probable
conclusions in the light of what is known. But this requires some-
one performing the arduous task of adjudicating the issue in the
light of all that is known.223 It requires a consideration of all of the
known relevant data, both external and internal. Internal evidence
based only upon the written text is insufficient and unreliable.224
The main task is to discover as much external evidence as possible.
Again, with respect to this task, Corbin and Hirsch are in agree-
ment. Corbin admits that discovering external evidence "may in-
deed be a difficult task. '225 Similarly, Hirsch states that such dis-
covery requires "severe discipline" and "an irritable reaching after
fact and reason.
226
When considering external evidence, both assert that evidence
must be accepted as relevant whenever it helps to show any ex-
218. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation at 66-7 (cited in note 8).
219. Id.
220. Id at 164.
221. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 535 at 15-16, § 543 at 150 (cited in note 11);
Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation at ix, 207 (cited in note 8).
222. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation at 17 (cited in note 8).
223. Id at 171.
224. Id at 193.
225. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 543 at 140 (cited in note 11).
226. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation at ix (cited in note 8).
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isting usage of the specific word or words being interpreted.2 7 For
example, usage can include customs and usages of other people in
similar circumstances and usages of words as reported in respecta-
ble dictionaries.2 28 Also, evidence is relevant whenever it increases
the number of instances in which the word has been used in a par-
ticular way being advocated by one of the parties. 2 9 Obviously,
general evidence of interpretations which occur more frequently is
weightier than general evidence of interpretations which occur less
frequently. Finally, detailed, specific evidence relating to the au-
thor or the text at issue is always more weighty than any general
evidence. 2 60 The chief concern, then, is to ferret out as much exter-
nal, detailed, specific information as possible about the particular
text and transaction at issue.23'
Application of these principles is illustrated by Hirsch's process
of determining the meaning of the word "wit" as used by an eight-
eenth century writer:
We infer that an eighteenth-century writer using the word "wit" probably
means something general like "intelligent competence" rather than just
"clever repartee," because the former is what other eighteenth-century writ-
ers mean by "wit" more often than not. . . . If, for example, we had fifty
instances of the word "wit" in the eighteenth century and found that thirty-
five of them used the word in its broad sense, then we would, in the absence
of other, narrowing data, be obliged to guess that the instance under scru-
tiny also conveys that broad sense. But while our judgment, on the basis of
the known data, would be valid, we could place very little reliance on it and
would undoubtedly seek to make our guess more reliable. If, on the other
hand, all known instances of "wit" in the eighteenth century conveyed the
broad sense, then we could place far more reliance on our guess, since its
probability of being correct would have greatly increased ....
[For more reliability], [t]he kind of evidence we need is information con-
cerning those instances which are more and more like the instance about
which we are guessing. If, for example, we ascertain that our text is by a
man named Rivers, and if we discover that Rivers apparently always uses
"wit" to mean "clever repartee," then, on this further evidence, we would be
227. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 140, 150 (cited in note 11); Hirsch, Validity in In-
terpretation at 184 (cited in note 8).
228. Corbin, 50 Cornell L Q at 190 (cited in note 11).
229. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts at 150 (cited in note 11); Hirsch, Validity in Inter-
pretation at 184 (cited in note 8).
230. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation at 185 (cited in note 8).
231. Id at 186, 188. See also Corbin, 50 Cornell L Q at 188-89 (cited in note 11). "First




right to guess that the present use also means "clever repartee" even though
this guess is in conflict with the guess made on the basis of all known uses
of the word in the eighteenth century.
232
If we apply these principles to resolve an issue of meaning that
seems to arise frequently with commercial loan documents, such as
the meaning of "demand" in a demand note, we would first accept
any evidence of usages of the word in similar circumstances, both
by banks in general and by the specific bank who is a party to the
present litigation. Consequently, we would accept the testimony of
the bank president who testified that "based on his knowledge of
banking practices . . . a bank could not simply terminate [an
agreement with a demand provision] capriciously," and that "the
absence of a time term in [a demand] note indicated the likelihood
that the schedule for repayment of the principal was governed by a
verbal agreement .. ."' Similarly relevant would be the testi-
mony of the bank president who testified that "it was not a policy
of [his bank] to terminate financing without notice [if a loan was
well secured]. ' 234
In the absence of other narrowing data, if, in the majority of
similar situations, "demand" was interpreted as meaning "demand
only after reasonable notice if a loan was well secured," then that.
would be the most valid, objective interpretation to give the word,
but only if that was a meaning of which the borrower was aware
and a meaning that could be said to have been conveyed to the
borrower by the bank. When we are only relying on general evi-.
dence of this type, the concept of shareability is important. The
meaning must be one that was shared by the parties; it cannot be a
special meaning known to only one of the parties. The concept of
shareability thus requires consideration of the special mentality,
experience and education of the parties, particularly the borrower,
to determine if the borrower was able to understand the special
meaning being given to the word "demand." If the borrower was
not aware of the policy of the bank to give notice before demand-
ing payment, and that meaning was not otherwise conveyed to
(shared with) the borrower, then he cannot be said to have a rea-
sonable expectation of receiving notice before demand under a de-
mand provision.
Most importantly, for more reliable interpretations, we would
232. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation at 184-85 icited in note 8)(emphasis in
original).
233. Reid, 821 F2d at 14.
234. K.M.C., 757 F2d at 761.
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accept evidence of the antecedent negotiations and communica-
tions between the parties as to the meaning the parties gave to the
word. In addition, we would accept evidence of the conduct of the
parties subsequent to signing the agreement that related to the
word at issue. This evidence would, of course, outweigh any of the
general evidence described above since it would tell us specifically
what meaning the parties themselves gave to the word. There is,
inevitably, the risk of self-serving testimony. Nevertheless, there is
always such a risk in any trial, and the job of the fact finder is to
listen to all of the evidence and determine who is telling the truth
and who is not. Obviously, the more uncommon the definition be-
ing advocated, the harder the advocate must work to convince the
fact finder that her definition is the most valid, objective definition
based on all of the evidence.
The principles advocated above are illustrated by Siegner v In-
terstate Product Credit Ass'n 3 5 ("Interstate"), one of the few
cases in which a court considered all of the relevant evidence, after
taking a rather circuitous route.23
In Siegner, the communications and negotiations between Mr.
Siegner and Mr. Fewel (the "Borrowers") and Interstate began in
the late 1970's when Ron Jinings, a loan officer of Interstate, vis-
ited the Borrowers to persuade them to start doing business with
his employer. Jinings told them that his employer was the premier
agricultural lender in the region; that it understood the ups and
downs of the cattle market; and that it stayed with its borrowers
for the "long haul. 2 37 The Borrowers initially rebuffed Jinings' ef-
forts. Jinings, however, was not a quitter; he continued to visit
them every few months. Finally, in 1980, he persuaded them to
purchase a nearby cattle ranch - the Coleman Ranch. 38 Aware that
it would take at least fifteen years to make an appreciable reduc-
tion in the indebtedness created by this purchase, Jinings advised
the Borrowers that Interstate could, of course, be counted on to
not only finance the down payment, but also to advance funds in
the future to pay for the annual payments for the Coleman Ranch
235. 190 Or App 417, 820 P2d 20 (1991).
236. Siegner, 820 P2d at 25-28. First the court had to find a way around the road
block set up by the parol evidence rule. Thus, it initially engaged in a rather lengthy, in-
volved explanation of the rule before it could admit all of the relevant evidence surrounding
the making of the agreement, including the communications and negotiations that occurred
prior to signing the agreement. Id.
237. Id at 23.
238. Id at 22-23.
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and Wrench Ranch, a ranch presently-owned by the Borrowers but
with an unpaid balance.2 39 Also during their discussions, in addi-
tion to telling the Borrowers that Interstate would not interfere
with the Borrowers' management, Jinings led the Borrowers to be-
lieve that Interstate would provide financing to begin a yearling
operation" ' and would provide financing to replace culled cows so
the ranch could remain stocked to capacity.241
Relying on Jinings' assurances and with Jinings' knowledge, the
Borrowers executed an agreement to purchase the ranch with an-
nual payments extending over fifteen years. After signing the sales
agreement for the ranch, the Borrowers, without any counsel, met
with Jinings to execute the loan documents. 4 ' Notwithstanding
Jinings' assurances of noninterference with management and his
awareness of the need for long-term financing, the loan was struc-
tured for only one year and contained a provision which permitted
Interstate to require the Borrowers to inject cash if the loan mar-
gin fell below acceptable levels.243 Not unexpectedly, the Borrowers
were surprised, since Jinings' statements had indicated that the
agreement would be otherwise. Jinings told the Borrowers not to
worry about the one year structure and the requirement of cash
injection. Both were mere formalities. Interstate would, without
significantly changing the major terms of the loan, roll over the
balance from year to year until the loan was paid in full. On these
assurances, the Borrowers signed the documents.
2 44
Despite these comforting words of assurance, each time the loan
came up for renewal, Interstate added some new condition or re-
fused to extend financing to the level Jinings had promised. First,
it refused to loan sufficient funds to enable the Borrowers to re-
stock culled cows fully and to begin a yearling operation. Second, it
required one of the Borrowers to give a second mortgage on one of
his other ranches. Next, it declined to advance funds for the an-
nual payment of the Coleman Ranch. Eventually, it required liqui-
dation of the Coleman Ranch. Finally, in 1987, when Interstate be-
gan to demand liquidation of cattle on Wrench Ranch, the
239. Id at 22.
240. Id at 23. A yearling operation entails keeping calves for an additional season and








Subsequently, in September 1987, Interstate sent a letter threat-
ening foreclosure if the Borrowers did not submit an operation
plan acceptable to Interstate.246 Prior to this letter, the Borrowers
had submitted several plans, all of which Interstate rejected. Soon
after receipt of the letter, the Borrowers brought an action against
Interstate alleging the two all-time favorite claims - breach of con-
tract and breach of the implied duty of good faith.2 47 The court
implicitly recognized that the latter claim was inessential, and that
the only claim was whether Interstate breached its agreement, in-
cluding the promises manifested by Jinings to the Borrowers prior
to signing the loan documents.4 8 Since Interstate was not disput-
ing the making or the content of the oral assurances as presented
by the Borrowers, the court stated that the major underlying issue
was "whether the evidence surrounding the parties' agreement...
should have been excluded because of the parol evidence rule. ' 249
As stated earlier, the court felt compelled to engage in a long,
involved explanation and interpretation of the rule in order to ad-
mit the evidence.2 5 Despite the presence of a merger clause, which
the court decided was inconclusive, the court agreed with the jury
that the documents did not represent the entire agreement.25' The
court reasoned that the parties could not have intended a one year
loan because the Borrowers' cash flow and budget forms, which
were part of the loan agreement, clearly showed that sufficient in-
come would not be generated to pay the loans on their maturity
dates.2 52 Additionally, the court relied upon the circumstances sur-
rounding the extensive negotiations and execution of the written
documents, which showed that both the Borrowers and Interstate
knew at the time the loan documents were executed that it was
impossible for the Borrowers to pay the loan in one year. There-
fore, it would have been highly unlikely for either to have agreed
to a loan that would not be paid when due.2"3 Jinings' oral assur-
ances of long-term financing were additional factors on which the
245. Id at 24.
246. Id at 25.
247. Id at 22, 25.
248. Id at 25.
249. Id.
250. Id at 25-29.
251. Id at 26.
252. Id at 26-27.
253. Id at 27.
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court based its decision.2 5" Finally, the court considered Inter-
state's lending policies and the nature and volatility of the cattle
business to determine if the oral agreement to renew the loan an-
nually over the long term was inconsistent with the writings pro-
viding for one year loans.2 55 The court concluded that the oral
agreement was not inconsistent since the amounts required to
stock and operate the combined ranches varied from year to year,
and were to be worked out by the parties when the Borrowers sub-
mitted their proposed budget for the ensuing year.15 6 The court
then affirmed the lower court's decision to permit the jury to con-
sider the oral evidence for the purpose of establishing the oral
agreement.
57
Nonetheless, Interstate did not stop here. It then relied on an-
other common route to escape liability; the rule requiring definite-
ness and certainty of terms.5 8 Interstate contended that even if
the parol evidence was admissible, the alleged oral agreement was
indefinite as to the amount of the loan, the interest rate, the repay-
ment schedule and the term of the loan. 5 The court held, how-
ever, that there was no requirement that a contract be explicit or
precise, so long as the parties had agreed to a method for deter-
mining the performance agreed to by the parties.26 According to
the court, the parties had so agreed, since "[t]here was evidence
that defendant made assurances that it would renew the annual
loan over a 15-year period to permit plaintiffs to complete their
purchase of the Coleman Ranch [and] that defendant agreed to
lend an amount sufficient to operate both ranches annually, includ-
ing funds to make the payment due on the real estate, to pay for
operations and to keep the ranch properly culled and fully stocked
with cattle."26 '
Finally, the court summarily dispensed with the good faith issue,
since it was obviously unnecessary after the court decided that In-
terstate breached its agreement with the Borrowers. In essence, the
court concluded that because Interstate had breached its contrac-
tual duties to the Borrowers, it also breached the implied duty of
254. Id at 28.
255. Id at 27.
256. Id.
257. Id at 28.
258. Id at 28-29.
259. Id.




good faith. 2 '
Basically, the court followed Hirsch's principles. It started with
the first unmethodical and intuitive stage by giving some consider-
ation to the plain meaning of the written terms, particularly the
one year term of the promissory note and the merger clause. It did
not stop here, however, as many courts do.263 Instead, it went on to
the second methodical stage, testing the plain meaning against all
of the relevant evidence surrounding the making of the agreement.
The court accepted both (1) detailed specific evidence of the par-
ticular transaction at issue, such as cash flow and budget forms,
and (2) general evidence, such as Interstate's lending policies and
the cattle business.264 Finally, it determined, based primarily on
the "past shared experiences" of the Borrowers and Jinings, (spe-
cifically their antecedent negotiations and communications,) that it
was not unreasonable for the Borrowers to interpret the one year
agreement to mean that it would be renewed without any signifi-
cant change in terms other than the amount to be loaned based
upon the Borrowers' needs.26 5 Furthermore, the court concluded
that it was not unreasonable for the Borrowers to expect that the
amount to be loaned would include funds for a yearling operation,
replacement cattle and annual payments for the Coleman Ranch
and Wrench Ranch.266 Additionally, the court, in keeping with the
principles of Hirsch, acknowledged that in its interpretive task, it
was not dealing with certainty, but only with probabilities. It
therefore postulated its conclusion in terms of probabilities: "It
would have been highly unlikely for either plaintiffs or defendant
to have agreed to a loan for only one year that would not be paid
when due.
'2 7
A comparison of the analysis used above, which illustrates
Hirsch's principles, with the formalistic, individualistic analysis
used by the Seventh Circuit in Kham a8 shows that the Hirsch ap-
proach is preferable because it leads to more validity, intellectual
respectability and, most importantly, fairness. It does so because it
leads to the agreement most likely intended by the parties by con-
sidering and weighing all of the relevant evidence. Furthermore,
262. Id at 31-32.
263. See, for example, Kham, 908 F2d at 1357; and Shiplet, 762 P2d at 245.
264. Siegner, 820 P2d at 26-27.
265. Id at 27.
266. Id at 29.
267. Id at 27.
268. See notes 168-98 and accompanying text.
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when the court's analysis in Siegner is compared to the collectivis-
tic analysis used by the Sixth Circuit in K.M.C.,26 9 it is evident
that here as well, Hirsch's approach is preferable. The Siegner
court searches for the agreement of the parties based upon all of
the relevant evidence, not some agreement fabricated by the fact
finder as the most commercially reasonable. Additionally, the
Hirsch approach is the only one that acknowledges present day
business practices of commercial lenders, who engage in extrinsic
conduct that affects the borrowers' interpretation of the meaning
of the written agreement. Finally, it is the only approach that ful-
fills one of the chief purposes of contract law - securing the realiza-
tion of expectations reasonably induced by the outward manifesta-
tions of the parties.
CONCLUSION
The ubiquitous implied duty of good faith is a doctrine that
adds nothing but confusion and, sometimes, injustice when relied
upon in cases in which a borrower is suing its lender for what is in
reality a breach of contract claim, where the underlying issue is
one of interpretation. Nevertheless, because most courts do not
look beyond the four corners of the written document in cases in-
volving financial institutions, borrowers have had to rely upon the
equitable principle of the implied duty of good faith to protect
their rights. More specifically, because of strict adherence to the
formalistic rules of contract relating to interpretation, such as the
plain meaning rule, the parol evidence rule, and the definiteness of
terms rule, borrowers have been prevented from presenting evi-
dence of loan officers' conduct to prove the meanings given to cer-
tain written terms in loan documents. As a result, lenders have
sometimes been permitted to escape contractual liability. Focus on
the duty of good faith, however, has obfuscated the real issue,
which is, what meaning did the parties give to the terms in the
written agreement? In addition, imposition of a duty of good faith
has sometimes unjustly created duties to which the banks never
agreed.
The resolution of the problem is explicit recognition that the is-
sue is one of interpretation, not of good faith. Then, courts must
begin to apply a coherent standard of interpretation that reflects
current banking practices and determines the intent of the parties
at the time the agreement was made. In order to do this, courts
269. See notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
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must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the making of
the agreement. The standard suggested by this article is based
upon the principles of E.D. Hirsch. Hirsch believes that one must
base interpretation on all of -the relevant evidence surrounding the
text, especially detailed, specific evidence extrinsic to the text. As
applied to the interpretation of commercial loan documents, this
means that courts must begin to move beyond the four corners of
written agreements and consider the circumstances surrounding
the making of the agreement between the parties. This includes
the negotiations and communications between the parties; general
bank practices in similar situations; and the special mentality, ex-
perience and education of the parties. As a result, the agreement
that will be imposed upon the parties will be the agreement that
was intended by the parties based on their outward manifestations
and their "shared experiences." Unjust and illogical results can
then more often be prevented, and banks can be held accountable
for their not uncommon "comforting words of assurance."
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